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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER: DOES THE 
CONSTITUTION MAITER? 
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Peter Irons, War Powers: How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the 
Constitution (Henry Holt & Co., 2005) 
John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs 
After 9/11 (University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
Reviewed by D.A. Jeremy Telman· 
Peter Irons's War Powers favors congressional initiative in questions of war and 
peace but makes a historical argument that our government has strayed from the 
constitutional design in the service of an imperialist foreign policy. John Yoo's 
The Powers of War and Peace seeks to overthrow the traditional perspective on 
war powers espoused by Irons in favor of executive initiative in war. Yoo also 
pursues a revisionist perspective on the treaty power, which favors executive 
initiative in treaty negotiation and interpretation but insists on congressional 
implementation so as to minimize the impact of international obligations on 
domestic law. This Essay criticizes Irons's approach for its failure to provide a 
normative defense of congressional initiative in war and takes issue with some of 
the historical and structural analyses underlying Yoo's defense of executive 
unilateralism in the realm of war powers. Because Yoo's arguments on the treaty 
power raise questions of methodological consistency, he is susceptible to the 
criticism that his arguments .are motivated more by prudential and policy 
considerations than by fidelity to constitutional text, structure, and history. The 
Essay concludes that, while the constitutional text, structure, and history are clear 
and consistent and support Irons's arguments favoring congressional war powers, 
the Constitution provides little guidance on how the treaty power should operate. 
Yoo)s view that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in constitutional 
text or structure. This Essay offers a structural interpretation of the constitutional 
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treaty power different from Yoo's that would promote U.S. participation in 
multilateral treaty regimes that foster security and the rule of la.w. 
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I. INTRODUCI'ION 
Just when it seemed that Congress and the federal judiciary were going to 
let the executive branch have its way in the war on. terror, the five-Justice 
majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 announced that it will scrutinize executive 
conduct in that conflict for compliance with norn1s mandated by both Congress 
and international law.2 The Court asserted its power to have some say in the 
debate over foreign affa:irs powers. It remains to be seen just how active a role 
the courts will play, thus reinvigorating a debate that was beginning to seem 
purely academic over the proper allocation of such powers under the U.S. 
Constitution. 
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
2. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 ("[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try 
Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the [Uniform Code 
of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions."). 
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This Essay reviews two new books that take diametrically opposed 
positions. In his War Powers,3 Peter Irons favors congressional initiative in the 
realm of war powers, while John Yoo's The Powers of War and Peace4 favors 
deference to the executive on foreign affairs. The Hamdan decision is to be 
welcomed not because it resolves thorny questions regarding the foreign affairs 
power, but because it opens a debate that both Irons and Yoo would like to 
foreclose. As Justice Breyer put it: 
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, 
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's 
ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens 
the Nation's ability to determine through democratic means how 
best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic 
means. Our Court today simply does the same.5 
While Yoo has argued that the judiciary's role in foreign affairs should be 
very small,6 Irons. blames executive decision making for substantive policy 
decisions that he claims have "hijacked" the Constitution. This Essay argues, 
with Justice Breyer, that the direction of our country's foreign affairs must 
ultimately be detertnined through democratic processes involving all three 
branches of the federal government, participatory politics, and compliance with 
the United States' obligations under international law. 
John Y oo is a self-described "revisionist"7 legal scholar who, in a series of 
controversial articles,8 and now in this book, has sought to challenge traditional 
3. PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE lMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
4. JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CoNSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AFTER 9/11 (2005). 
5. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6. Yoo criticized the Hamdan decision in an editorial published just one day after the decision. 
''What the justices did would have been unthinkable in prior military conflicts: Judicial intervention in 
the decisions of the president and Congress on how best to wage war.'' John Yoo, 5 Wrong Justices: 
Ruling Mistakes War for Familiarity of Nation's Criminal Justice System, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, 
at A22. 
7. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that his book "will be counted as a contribution to the 
revisionist side" and naming Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Saikrishna Prakash~ and Michael 
Ramsey among revisionists questioning "dominant intellectual paradigm" on foreign affairs power). 
8. Many of Yoo's arguments in the book were anticipated in earlier publications. See, e.g., John 
C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Te~t, 69 U. On. L. REv. 1639 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War and the 
Constitutional Text] (advocating textualist approach to determining allocation of constitutional war 
powers); John C. Yoo, Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (advocating structural approach to explain limited constitutionality of 
congressional-executive agreements); John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the 
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES 
FITzGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, SJ'AR WARS AND TilE END OF THE COLD 
WAR (2000)) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics as Law] (defending Presidenfs authority unilaterally to 
interpret, implement, and abrogate treaties); John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the M!..ltilateral 
Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1689 (2000) (addressing effects of multilateral defense treaties on 
constitutional allocation of war powers); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War 
Powers Debate, 10 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Clio at War] (criticizing historical 
methodology of legal scholars in war powers debate and making historical argument in favor of 
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scholarly views on the foreign affairs power comprising the treaty power and 
war powers. Yoo is an especially important figure because he not only has 
advocated his positions in well-placed and influential scholarly articles but has 
worked to put them into practice as legal advisor to the Justice Department 
during the first term of President George W. B_ush.9 Relying neither on the 
postratification statements of the Framers nor on court precedent, Yoo 
interprets the constitutional text,. structure, and preratification history10 as 
supporting his expansive views_ on the proper s_cope of executive foreign affairs 
powers.11 For example, despite the Declare War Clause,12 Yoo argues that the 
Constitution actually empowers the executive, not Congress, to take the 
initiative in committing the United States to the use of force. 13 With respect to 
the treaty power, Yoo contends that the Constitution primarily empowers the 
President to negotiate, to implement, to interpret, and, if necessary, to abrogate 
treaties.14 He denies treaty law any binding force as U.S. law unless implemented 
through the exercise of congressional legislative powers.15 
executive war powers); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural 
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (arguing that treaties should be 
presumptively non-self-executing); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non·Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (same); John C. Yoo, The 
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation of Politics] (arguing that constitutional design was for 
political branches to share war powers, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes antagonistically, but 
that judicial supervision of war ·powers is both unworkable and undesirable). 
9. According to the New York Times, despite the fact that he was only a midlevel advisor, 
because of Yoo's expertise in the area, he quickly established himself "as a critical player in the Bush 
administration's legal response to the terrorist threat, and an influential advocate for the expansive 
claims of presidential authority that have been a hallmark of that response.'' Tim Golden, A Junior 
Aide Had a Big Role ih Terror Policy, N.Y. TIMES, De-c. 23, 2005, at A1; see also David Cole, What 
Bush Wants to Hear, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Nov. 17, 2005, at 8, 8 ('~Yoo· had a hand in virtually every 
major legal decision involving the US response to the attacks of Septe.mber 11. ... "). 
10. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 ("(T]his book concentrates less on judicial precedent and more on 
constitutional text, structure, and history."). 
11. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 9, at 8 (contending that Yoo's advice to President was always the 
same: "the president can do whatever the president wants"); Golden, supra note 9 (stating that Yoo 
authored legal opinions contending that Geneva Conventions did not apply to war on terror, 
"countenanc[ing] the use of highly coercive interrogation techniques on terror suspects'' and 
approving of warrantless eavesdropping on "international communications of Americans and others 
inside the United States"). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
13. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 ("The president need not receive a declaration of war before 
engaging the· U.S. armed forces in hostilities."); Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 8, at 170 
("[T]he Framers created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war."). 
14. See Yoo, supra note. 4, at 8 (stating that Constitution dictates that President is empowered 
with "primary initiative to make·, interpret,. and t~rminate international agreements"); Yoo, Politics as 
Law, supra note 8, at 870 (arguing that executive has unilateral power to interpret domestic effect of 
treaty obligations). 
15. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 281 (arguing that in order to maintain "the line between executive 
and legislative power, and between treatymaking and lawmaking," treaties must be presumptively 
non-self~executing and congressional...executive agreements must be pennitted only in substantive 
legal areas that implicate Congress's enumerated powers). 
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Peter Irons is a political scientist who has previously published A People's 
History of the Supreme Court.16 His frequent citations to that previous work and 
to Howard Zinn's A People's History of the United States: 1492 - Present11 
telegraph the radical political perspective that underlies Irons's approach to the 
question of war powers.18 Although Irons never directly addresses either the 
methodology or the substantive arguments of Yoo and other revisionist scholars, 
he clearly believes that the Constitution allocates war powers to Congress.19 He 
nevertheless acknowledges that "the Constitution has not stood firm as a barrier 
against presidential disregard of its command that only Congress has the power 
to declare war. "20 
Irons and Y oo have diametrically opposed views of the meaning of the 
Constitution as to war powers, but that would only lead them to have opposed 
views on the proper allocation of war powers if they were both convinced 
constitutional originalists. Neither Yoo nor Irons, however, express any 
commitment to originalism.21 Irons makes the traditional argument that the 
Framers intended to entrust war powers to Congress,22 but he makes no 
normative argument for why we should be bound to that allocation today. Yoo's 
position is more complicated. He rejects Irons's "intentionalist" approach in 
favor of a "textualist" approach that inquires into the original meaning of the 
constitutional text as it would have been understood by informed readers at the 
time of its ratification.23 Y oo argues that this textual approach supports "a 
16. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF 1HE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
17. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492- PRESENT (2003). 
18. The minimal scholarly apparatus appended to Irons's book likely does not do justice to 
Irons's scholarly exertions. Nevertheless, the number of secondary sources to which he cites is 
strikingly small and includes only Abraham Sofaer's War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power 
representing the pro-executive side of the war powers debate. E.g., IRONS, supra note 3, at 25 (citing 
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 49 
(1976)) (discussing debates that took place during constitutional conventions over powers delegated to 
executive and legislative branches). Since Irons writes to address the current war on terror, it is also 
noteworthy that the only post-9/11 secondary sources to which he cites are written by journalists, Nat 
Hentoff and Bob Woodward. See id. at 275-90 (citing NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON TilE BILL OF 
RIGHTS AND THE GA1HERING RESISTANCE 66 (2003) ; BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 15, 118; 340 
(2002); BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 132 (2004)) {discussing aftermath of 9/11 and Bush's 
response). 
19. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 3-4 (stating that "Framers placed the war-declaring power solely 
in the hands of Congress" while limiting President's authority to that of repelling attacks on American 
territory or authorizing reprisals for attacks on U.S. citizens or property abroad or on high seas). 
20. /d. at 242. Unlike Yoo's book, Irons's book focuses exclusively on war powers and does not 
address the treaty power. 
21. Yoo provides an oddly diffident account of originalism, noting that some Supreme Court 
Justices support originalism while others favor a "living Constitution." Yoo, supra note 4, at 25. He 
also notes, without taking sides, that academics differ over "how much deference to provide the 
Framers." !d. 
22. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 23 (arguing that Framers intended five war powers clauses of 
Article I to be read together in order to "lodgeD the ultimate power over the nation's armed forces in 
Congress"). 
23. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 28 ("It is the original understanding of the document held by its 
ratifiers that matters, not the original intentions of its drafters."). 
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flexible decisionmaking system that can respond to such sweeping changes in the 
international system and in America's national security posture."24 On war 
powers, Yoo stresses that the Constitution leaves the political branches of the 
federal government free to work out the allocation of war powers as they wish.25 
But where as with respect to aspects of the treaty power the constitutional 
text does not support such flexibility, Yoo cannot rely on an original 
understanding of the Constitution. Rather, he makes prudential arguments, 
suggesting that his primary allegiance as a scholar and as a political figure is not 
to textualist originalism. 26 
Part II of this Essay summarizes Irons's traditional approach to war 
powers which focuses on the intentions of the Framers and postratification 
history and argues that his book fails to resolve the central tension it describes 
between the constitutional allocation of war powers and recent practice, in which 
Presidents make key decisions involving use of force. Part III reviews Yoo's 
revisionist, textualist approach to war powers and suggests that textualism need 
not lead to results at odds with the traditional approach to the constitutional 
allocation of war powers. Part IV reviews Yoo's arguments with respect to the 
. . 
treaty power and contends that these arguments are linked less by their 
commitment to textualist originalism than by their ingenuity in promoting 
executive primacy in foreign affairs and in promoting federalist and separation of 
powers principles over other constitutional principles that would give treaty law 
binding force as U.S. law. 
Finally, in Part V, this Essay argues that the Constitution's meaning should 
not be left for the executive branch to determine. With respect to war powers, 
this Part presents alternative "structural" interpretations of the Constitution and 
argues that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution undermine 
both Irons's interpretation, which does not permit for the evolution of 
constitutional doctrines relating to the allocation of war powers, and Yoo's 
interpretation, which presumes grants of executive power that are neither 
express nor implied in the constitutional text. While Yoo's structural 
interpretation with respect to the treaty power focuses on separation of powers, 
Part V explores other structural elements to the Constitution., including limited 
government, federalism, checks and balances, and a commitment to the efficacy 
of international law. 
24. /d. at x-xi. 
25. /d. at 8 ("On the question of war, flexibility means there is no one constitutionally correct 
method for waging war."). 
26. See id. at 182 (arguing that government practice with respect to treaty power "represents the 
practical outcome of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches"); cf. PHILIP 
BOBB11T, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF TilE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (defining prudential 
arguments as "advancing particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a 
particular way"). Bobbitt later notes, summarizing Justice Hugo Black's textualist attack on the 
prudential jurisprudence of Justice Felix Frankfurter, "(I]f a prudential approach is used to decide 
between texts, then the texts themselves really count for nothing in the decision." Jd. at 60. 
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11. IRONS AND THE TRADITIONAL P-ERSPECfiVE ON WAR POWERS 
What I will here call the "traditional perspective" on war powers was 
formed in the decades following the Vietnam War, when scholars such as_ Louis 
Fisher, Louis Henkin, Michael Glennon, Harold Koh, and John Hart Ely all 
published books contending that the constitutional allocation of war powers calls 
for congressional involvement in decisions involving the use of force and judicial 
review of decisions relating to war and peace_.27 Although the sudden scholarly 
passion for congressional war powers was linked to the Vietnam War and the ill-
fated War Powers Resolution,28 its proponents maintain that their views on war 
powers were simply assumed to be correct until the Nuclear Age. As Louis 
Fisher puts it: 
With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the Constitution 
created a structure to prevent presidential wars. . . . Making 
fundamental judgments about representative government, popular 
control, and human nature, they placed the power of war and peace 
with the legislative branch and divided foreign policy between the 
President and Congress. For the most part, the Fram_ers' model 
prevailed from 1789 to 1950.29 
Support for the traditional perspective derives largely from three sources: 
the constitutional text; statements by the Framers during the Constitutional 
Convention, the ratification debates, or the early republic; and statements by 
27. JOHN HARTEL Y, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND 
ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER1 PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed., rev. 2004); MICHAEL J. 
GLENNON, CONSTffUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LoUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS {1990) (hereinafter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM); LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TilE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING PO\VER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); W. TAYLOR REVELEY Ill, WAR POWERS 
OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND 0LlVE BRANCH? (1981);. 
FRANCIS D. WORMUTH ET AL., To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN 
HISTORY AND LAw (1986). Y_oo critiques the traditional _approach as follows: 
' 
Conventional wisdom on the legal framework governing American foreign relations has 
suffered from three significant flaws. First, scholars have sought to impose a strict, legalistic 
process on the interaction of the executive and legislative branches in reaching decisions on 
war and peace. Second, they have claimed that the original understanding of the framing 
generation both dictates the limitation of presidential power in foreign affairs and 
establishes a broad power in the federal government to make and implement international 
. . 
agreements and in~ernational law. Third, they rely on judicial intervention to enforce this 
precise vision of the balance of powers in foreign affairs, backed up as it is by the original 
understanding. 
Yoo,supra note 4, at 293. 
28. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1541-48 (2000)). 
29. Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV.l637, 1637 (2000). As late as 
1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee remarked in its report on the War Powers Resolution: 
"The transfer from Congress to the executive of the actual power as distinguished from the 
constitutional authority to initiate war has been one of the most remarkable developments in the 
constitutional history of the United Sates [sic]." S. REP. No. 93 .. 220, at 14 (1973). 
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later politicians, judges, and scholars. 30 In short, advocates of the traditional 
perspective argue that the original intentions of the Framers, as reflected in the 
constitutional text, legislative history, and subsequent statements by the Framers 
and others, were that -Congress holds the power to place the country in a state of 
war. 
Irons assumes that the traditional perspective on war powers is the only 
reasonable one, and his book demonstrates the problems that arise under the 
traditional approach. In Irons's view, the greatest harm done to the United 
States by the current war on terror consists neither in the loss of human life nor 
in the economic costs ofwar, but in the "gradual but increasing subversion of the 
U.S. Constitution. "31 The subversion consists of presidential usurpation of the 
congressional power to declare war.32 Irons points out, however, that Presidents 
have not acted alone in such usurpation. Congress and the federal courts have 
been willing accomplices, as have "generations of Americans" who have not 
called on their elected representatives to re_claim their constitutional war 
powers.33 
Because Irons takes no notice of recent challenges to his intentionalist 
approach to divining the meaning of the Constitution, he merely insists rather 
than shows that those who think the Presidents have extensive war powers are 
wrong.34 The main weakness of Irons's thesis, however, is that his book presents 
a version of U.S. history and foreign policy in which the political branches of the 
U.S. government have consistently strayed from what he takes to be the 
constitutional design in pursuit of what he describes as imperialist goals. While 
Irons sets out to demonstrate that the imperial presidency hijacked the 
constitutional allocation of war powers, what he in fact shows is that the political 
branches have acted together to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and have not 
let the niceties of the constitutional text, as he understands· them, interfere with 
implementing their policy goals. If Irons is correct that our constitutional history 
strays from the Framers' intentions regarding war powers, he needs to provide a 
normative argument for why those intentions should guide us today. 
A. Irons's Intentionalist Approach 
One of the strengths of Irons's book is that he economically sets out the 
basics of the traditional perspe_ctive's claim that the constitutional text itself, 
especially when considered in light of the Constitution's legislative history, 
establishes the Framers' intent to locate the vast majority of war powers in the 
30. For the most extended versions of this approach, see FISHER, supra note 27, REVELEY, supra 
note 27, and WORMUTH ET AL.,supra note 27. 
31. IRONS, supra note 3, at 2. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. See, e.g., id. at 24 (criticizing U.S. Presidents for relying on Commander in Chief Clause to 
"claim for themselves the war-making power the Framers specifically placed in the hands of 
Congress"); id. at 267-69 (arguing that disparities in funding, staffing, and media coverage explain why 
"Congress has virtually abdicated its constitutional war powers to the imperial presidency"). 
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Congress. 35 He recounts the familiar narrative of how the constitutional draft 
language, which would have given Congress the power to "make" war, was 
changed, substituting "declare'' for "make."36 Pierce Butler had proposed 
granting the power to make war to the executive. This proposal, tellingly, died 
for want of a second.37 All agreed (and all still agree) that the President must 
have the power to "repel sudden attacks."38 Still, Irons argues, the Framers' 
intent was that "only Congress could authorize the deployment of forces outside 
the nation's territory in combat against foreign troops."39 
For Irons, the Framers' intent to repose war powers in Congress is made 
manifest when one considers not just the Declare War Clause but the totality of 
war powers enumerated in Article 1.40 In addition to granting Congress the 
power to declare war, the Constitution also gives Congress the power to issue 
letters of marque and reprisal and set rules concerning captures on land and 
water;41 "[t]o raise and support Armies;';42 "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy;"43 
"[t]o make Rules for the. Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces;"44 "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;"45 and "[t]o provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part ·Of 
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.''46 Moreover, in 
case there was any doubt, Congress also has the appropriations power,47 its 
power to tax is linked to its obligation to "provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States,"48 and it has the power to make all "Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"49 any of the 
other enumerated powers. There is no other area where the Framers made their 
intentions manifest through so many separate constitutional provisions. 
The President's war powers derive from two textual sources: the 
commander-in-chief power50 and Article II's Vesting Clause. 51 The treaty power 
35. See, e.g.~ FISHER, supra note 27, at 12 ("Whether declared or undeclared, the decision to 
initiate war was left to Congress."). 
36. IRONS, supra note 3, at 21. 
37. ld. at 20-21 ., 
38. /d. at 21. 
39. ld. 
40. See id. at 23 ("Read together~ as the Framers clearly intended them to be, the five clauses in 
Article 1 of the Constitution lodged the ultimate power over the nation's armed forces in Congress."). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8; cl. 11. 
42. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
43. Id. art. I,§ 8, cl.13. 
44. /d. art. I,§ 8, cl. 14. 
45. /d. art. I,§ 8; cl.l5. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl.16. 
47. ld. art. I,§ 7, cl. 1. 
48. /d. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1. 
49. /d. art. I,§ 8; cL 18. 
50. Jd art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
51. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1. 
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and the Appointments Clause supplement these clauses to constitute a 
considerable grant of foreign relations power to the President, but that power is 
not generally viewed as granting war powers to the President.52 From the 
traditional perspective, these provisions grant the President broad powers to 
conduct foreign relations on behalf of the United States, but subject to the 
limitations provided through the enumeration of congressional powers in Article 
. 53 I. 
The traditional view that the commander-in-chief power is narrowly 
circumscribed is buttressed by the constitutional text, which specifies that the 
President "shall be Commander in ChieJ of the Arn1y and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States."54 The Framers saw standing armies under the control of a 
powerful executive as a threat to democracy and thus anticipated that there 
would be no significant federal army.55 Alexander Hamilton, no enemy of 
executive power, acknowledged that the President would exercise his 
commander ... in-chief power only in "the direction of war when authorized or 
begun."56 Moreover, as Irons indicates in the one area of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century history where he is more thorough than Yoo, the point of the 
commander-in-chief power traditionally was not to create executive war powers 
but to subordinate the military to civil authority.57 
52. Neither the traditional perspective nor Yoo's revisionist approach treat the treaty power or 
the Appointments Clause as creating war powers. Indeed, Yoo reasons by analogy that the 
Appointments aause limits the President's power to authorize U.S. military personnel to serve under 
foreign command as part of multinational forces. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 176-81 (stating that foreign 
commanders would not be subject to executive power in same way other appointees would be, and as 
result, unless executive "[r]etain[s] policy and tactical command," use of foreign commanders would 
likely violate-Constitution); cf FISHER, supra note 27, at 12-13 (discussing only Commander in Chief 
Clause as source for executive war powers). 
53. See IRONS, supra_ note 3, at 23 (arguing that exe_cutive war powers were limited to response to 
"immediate situation" and that Congress alone could grant President authority to command troops). 
54. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2 (emphasis added). 
55. See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF TiiE 
U.S. CONS'I'fi'UTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 120-21 (2003) (recounting Anti-
Federalist opposition to standing armies and discussing Federalist plans for peacetime force of 3000, 
including corps of engineers); REVELEY, supra note 27, at 65 (characterizing federalist view as "there 
would be no armies, navies, or militia for [the President) to lead unless Congress so provided'~); 
WORMUTH ET AL, supra note 27, at 110 (recounting Feder~list responses to concerns about executive 
abuse of commander-in-chief power, which centered on Congress's ability to check that power through 
its power to raise fleets and armies); Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1680 
("After the peace with Great Britain, the United States did not immediately maintain a large 
peacetime army or navy and did not really do so until the Cold War."). 
56. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 292 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); see 
also IRONS, supra note 3, at 26-27 (citing Iredell, Hamilton, and Madison and concluding that 
"Madison's emphatic statement, and the entire record of the Constitutional Convention, leaves no 
doubt that the Framers agreed that Congress, the body elected by the people, should hold the 
awesome power to commit the-nation to war"). 
57. See_ IRONS, supra note 3, at 24-25 (stating that it became fundamental principle of U.S. 
Constitution, as it was in British Army, that military officers be placed under command ofa civilian); 
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That leaves Article II's Vesting Clause as the most likely source for 
significant war powers. As Y oo and others have pointed out) 58 unlike Article I, 
which vests in Congress only "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted,"59 Article 
II simply states that "[ t ]he executive Power shall be vested in a fresident of the 
United States of America."60 Yoo takes this to signify that, while Congress)s 
constitutional powers are limited to those enumerated in Article I, the President 
has all powers associated with executive power at the time of the framing.61 The 
traditional perspective rejects any claim of executive war powers based on the 
Vesting Clause alone, which on its face seems to indicate only that the executive 
power will be invested in one President rather than in a plural body, as it was, for 
example, under the Articles of Confederation.62 Yoo's argument for executive 
powers purports to be a textual argument based on the Article II Vesting 
Clause.63 In fact, Yoo's argument is based on an interpretation of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century political theory and practice, which in turn generates an 
interpretation of the constitutional text.64 The text of the Constitution, standing 
alone, lends strong support to the traditional perspective on war powers. 65 As 
John Hart Ely has pointed out, while the original intent of the Framers is often 
so obscure that we are really left to our own devices, the Constitution is perfectly 
clear in the realm of war powers.66 
B. Irons's Historical Approach 
If the textual argument in favor of congressional control over war is not 
convincing enough, Irons's book also does an excellent job of setting out some of 
the best evidence from the legislative history and from subsequent historical 
gloss_es on the constitutional text to establish a strong foundation for the 
cf WORMUTH ET AL., supra note 27, at 105-07 (providing brief history of office of commander in chief 
in English and colonial history from 1639 through American Revolution). 
58. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting Justice Scalia as stating that Article Il's Vesting 
Clause "does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power" is vested in the 
President (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
60. /d. art. lit§ 1. 
61. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 ("If we assume that the foreign affairs power is an executive one, 
Article II effectively grants to the president any unenumerated foreign affairs powers not given 
elsewhere to the other branches.;'). 
62. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 554 (2004) ("The Article II Vesting Clause may simply make clear 
' 
where the executive_ power is being vested in a unitary President not the scope of that power."). 
63. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18, 183-84. 
64. See id. at 30-54 (examining allocation of war and treaty powers in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century thought and in Anglo-American practice). 
65. REVELEY, supra note 27, at 29 ("If we could find a man in the state of nature and have him 
first scan the war·power provisions of the Constitution .•• he would marvel at how much Presidents 
have spun out of so little,. On its face, the text tilts decisively toward Congress."). 
66. ELY, supra note 27, at 3 (contending that "original understanding)' of Constitution is often 
"obscure to the point of inscrutability," but tha.t Framers were clear in vesting power to declare war in 
Congress). 
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traditional perspective on war powers. On the structural level, Irons points to 
numerous writings by the Framers indicating their desire to have checks on 
executive power and their fear of executive unilateralism especially in the 
domain of war powers. 
After their experience with the English monarchy, the Framers sought to 
prevent such powers from being vested solely in the executive.67 Upon hearing 
Pierce Butler's recommendation that the power to initiate war be vested in the 
President, Elbridge Gerry remarked; "[I] never expected to hear in a republic a 
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."'68 Madison even 
proposed prohibiting the President from having a role in negotiating peace 
treaties.69 He feared that a President might try to impede the peace in order to 
derive "power and importance from a state of war. "70 
Later commentary by important Framers, both during the ratification 
debates and during the early republic, was consistent with statements made at 
the Constitutional Convention.71 As James Madison put it in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson: "The constitution supposes ... that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of 
power most interested in war, [and] most prone to it. It has accordingly with 
studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl[ature]."72 Similarly, writing 
as Helvidius in his exchange with Alexander Hamilton, Madison asserted that 
"[i]n _no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause 
which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the 
67. Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison: "We have already given ... one effectual check 
to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative 
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.," Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James 
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392,397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) 
(footnote omitted). 
68. IRONS, supra note 3, at 21 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
supra note 56, at 318). Eight delegates stated their opposition to giving the executive the power to 
initiate war. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF 1787, supra note 56, at 64-66, 70, 
291-92, 318, 319 (recording statements of Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, James Wilson, James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, and George Mason). Two other 
delegates, Oliver Ellsworth and Rufus King, strongly suggested that the President should not have 
substantial war powers. /d. at 319. 
69. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 56, at 540. 
70. Jd. 
71. See Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor 
Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685, 1713-17 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Text and. History] (reviewing 
evidence from 1790s in favor of expansive reading of Declare War Cause); Michael D. Ramsey, 
Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. On. L. REV. 1543, 1603-09 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, TextlUllism] 
(collecting quotations from Alexander Hamilton, James Iredell, Charles Pinckney, James Madison, 
and James Wilson and reviewing practice of Washington presidency, all favoring congressional over 
executive war powers). 
72. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRmNGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 311,312 (Gaillard Hunted., 1906). Madison expressed the same ·views 
during his Helvidius/Pacificus exchange with Hamilton: "(T]he executive is the department of power 
most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence-it is the practice_ of all states, in proportion as they 
are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence." James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. W, 
GAZE1TE U.S., Sept. 14, 1793, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra, at 138, 174. 
.• 
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executive department."73 As Michael Ramsey put it, "Madison, Hamilton, 
Jefferson, Wilson, Washington, Jay, Marshall, and an array of lesser figures 
indicated that war power lay primarily with Congress, and no prominent figure 
took the other side. ''74 
In the early republic, courts, to the extent that they weighed in on the 
subject, generally supported the notion of congressional control over questions 
of war and peace. In Bas v. Tingy,15 Justices Washington and Patterson analyzed 
the state of affairs between the United States and France in terms of whether 
congressional actions sufficed to establish a state of war between the two 
nations.76 In Little v. Barreme,11 Justice Marshall, although originally inclined to 
excuse Captain Little's trespass against a Dutch vessel on the ground that 
Captain Little's conduct was authorized by President Adams, acquiesced in the 
views of his brethren "that the instructions cannot . . . legalize an act which 
without those instructions would have been a plain trespass. "78 In short, the 
President could not unilaterally authorize a military action, even a trifling one, 
that exceeded the Congress's authorization for the use of force. Justice Paterson, 
riding circuit in New York, stated in United States v. Smith 19 that the President 
does not possess the power of making war because ''[t]hat power is exclusively 
vested in congress. "8° 
More significant, however, were the attitudes of the United States' first 
chief executives, as expressed during their presidencies. As early as 1793, when 
the Governor of Georgia asked President Washington to send U.S. troops to 
intervene in border skirmishes between frontier settlers and Indians, Washington 
declined, explaining that "no offensive expedition of importance" could be taken 
without congressional authorization.81 Washington's Secretary of War warned 
territorial governors that military operations were confined to defensive 
measures unless Congress decided otherwise,82 because Congress alone was 
73. Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. W, supra note 72, at 174. 
74. Ramsey, Textualism, supra note_ 71, at 1566. 
75. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
76. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40-42 (Washington, J.) (discussing possibilities of "solemn" and 
"imperfect" war); id. at 45 (Paterson, J.) (noting that United States and France were engaged in 
imperfect war and asserting that "[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so 
far may we proceed in hostile operations"); IRONS!< supra note 3, at 36-37. 
77. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
78. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179; IRONS, supra note 3, at 39. Marshall was never inclined to 
think that an executive order standing alone could authorize seizure of a foreign vesseL Rather, he 
thought that such an order might support excuse of damages. See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179 C'I 
confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the. opinion that though the instructions 
of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages."). 
79. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y~ 1806) (No. 16,342)~ 
80. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230; IRONS, supra note 3, at 41. 
81. Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie (Aug. 28, 1793), in 33 THE WRmNGs-
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73, 73 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
82. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERIUTORY SOUTII OF THE. RIVER OHIO, 1790-1796, at 194,. 195 
(Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936) [hereinafter THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES]. 
258 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
"vested with the powers of War"83 and Congress alone was "competent to decide 
upon an offensive war. ,84 Jefferson similarly explained to Congress that an 
American Navy Captain had disabled a Tripolitan pirate ship but had released 
the captured pirates becaose the Navy was not authorized to take nondefensive 
measures without the sanction of Congress.85 In Jefferson's view, Congress alone 
could determine the scope of a conflict, and if only a ransom should be 
demanded, Congress would set the amount. 86 
John Yoo has argued that a declaration of war is merely an official 
recognition that a state of war exists.87 The Declare War Clause thus is not a 
grant of legislative power to the Congress, but rather confers on Congress the 
power to make a declaratory judgment, which gives it authority to pass 
legislation appropriate for wartime.88 As Irons shows, however, in the early 
republic, Presidents recognized that they needed a congressional declaration of 
war before they could commence hostilities or even before, they could expand 
existing hostilities. The Declare War Clause thus was not understood as a grant 
of judicial power but as a grant of war powers. In June 1812, Madison declared 
that a "state of war" existed between the United States and Britain but 
presented Congress with 'Ha solemn question which the Constitution wisely 
confides to the legislative department of the Government. "'89 The, Senate at first 
refused to declare war and wanted to limit the U.S. response to reprisal but 
approved the declaration of war a few days later.90 'The incident makes clear that 
Madison, acting as President, believed that he needed ,congressional 
authorization before committing American forces to war, even though he 
believed that a state of war already existed. Irons shows that this perspective on 
war powers was generally shared by V~S. Presidents.91 
83. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Nov. 26, 1792), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STAlES, supra note82, at 220, '221. 
84. Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Mar. 23, 1795), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 82, at 386,389. 
85. Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 326,326-27 {James D. Richardson ed., 1900). 
86. /d. at 327; see also IRONS, supra note 3, at 31 (quoting Jefferson as stating, "Upon the whole; 
it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom as the means of re~establishing our 
Mediterranean commerce."). 
87. See Yoo; Continuation of Politics, supra note 8, at 207-08 ("[A] declaration of war served the 
purpose of notifying the ,enemy, allies, neutrals, and one's own citizens of a change in the state of 
relations between one nation and another. In none of these situations did a declaration of war serve as 
a vehicle for domestically deciding on or authorizing a war."). 
88. See Yoo, s1-1-pra note 4, at 332 n.14 ("(T]be Declare War Clause gives Congress the power to 
' ' ' 
'declare' whether ... a certain state of affairs legally constitutes a War, which then gives it the authority 
to enact wartime regulations of individual persons and property both within and outside the United 
States."). 
89. IRONS, supra note 3, at 47. 
90. /d. 
91. See, e.g., id. at 59-60 (quoting Lincoln to effect thaLauthors of Constitution had placed war 
power in handS of Congress because they '"resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man 
should hold the power' of taking the nation into war"); id. at 64 (quoting Buchanan, who told 
Congress in 1858 that the President ''cannot legitimately resort to force without the direct authority of 
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But Irons also presents a counternarrative that establishes a long tradition 
of U.S. Presidents exercising unilateral nondefensive war powers. According to 
Irons, Thomas Jefferson "first cracked open the door through which later 
presidents barged with impunity."92 In 1807, when a British vessel fired on the 
American frigate Chesapeake, Jefferson responded while Congress was in 
recess.93 Irons thinks the incident constituted a "compelling'' crisis to which 
Jefferson had to respond, but he also thinks later Presidents have used the 
excuse of necessity to justify executive unilateralism in much more questionable 
cases.94 
In 1846, President Polk claimed that Mexico had invaded U.S. territory and 
requested a declaration recognizing an existing state of war between the two 
countries.95 Still, Polk recognized that a fonnal declaration was required, and 
members of Congress at the time recognized that the President's declaration of 
war had no constitutional significance.96 But by midcentury, as Irons 
acknowledges, the federal judiciary was increasingly deferential toward 
executive authorizations of the use of force. 97 In the twentieth century, Irons 
laments, U.S. Presidents have become far bolder in their assertions of unilateral 
authority to use military force . 98 
C. Conclusion: The Normative Limitations of Originalism 
Irons's book offers two arguments: first, that Congress, the courts, and U.S. 
citizens have permitted Presidents to usurp war-making authority from the 
Congress; and second, that Presidents have exercised their war powers 
illegitimately, not only as a constitutional matter, but also geopolitically, to 
pursue an imperialist foreign policy. Irons believes that the United States goes to 
war far too readily and without much thought to the constitutional procedures 
that ought to guide it. 
Congress, except in resisting and repelling hostile attacks''); see also REVELEY, supra note 27, at 277-85 
(providing "sampler" of executive statements supporting congressional control over powers of war and 
peace). 
92. IRONS, supra note 3, at 42. 
93. Id. 
94. /d. at 42-43. 
95. ld. at 57. 
96. /d. (quoting Senator John Calhoun's denunciation of Polk for announcing war when "there is 
no war according to the sense of our Constitution''). 
97. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 63-64 (discussing Southern District of New York's ruling in 
Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186)), which upheld decision of naval 
commander to order bombardment of Nicaraguan port as part of executive authority to protect lives 
and _property of U.S. citizens); id. at 71-75 (discussing Civil War Priz.e Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 
(1862), and siding with four dissenters in accusing Supreme Court of abdicating its constitutional 
responsibility to say what law is). 
98. See, e.g., id. at 108 (discussing Woodrow Wilson's view that Presidents have absolute control 
over foreign affairs); id. at 129 (criticizing Franklin Delano Roosevelt's comnritment to lend destroyers 
to United Kingdom six months prior to congressional authorization of that deal through Lend-Lease 
Act); id. at 211 (noting that every President since Gerald Ford has claimed "the 'inherent' right to 
initiate military action without prior congressional approval''). 
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Irons does not argue, however, that congressional foreign policy objectives 
were any less imperialist than those of the executive. Thus, the relation between 
Irons's title, War Powers, and his subtitle, How the Imp,erial Presidency Hijacked 
the Constitution, is unclear.99 Moreover, even if we assume that Irons is correct 
about the constitutional design with respect to war powers, he provides no 
normative argument for why the Constitution must mean for us today what the 
Framers intended it to mean. Therefore, it is hard to see why Irons's narrative of 
executive war powers is one of constitutional hijack rather than one of 
constitutional development. In short, Irons's book provides an argument that the 
Constitution allocates war powers to Congress and a historical narrative that 
demonstrates that our practice has strayed from the historical design. He does 
not ponder the question of whether or to what extent the constitutional design 
should matter. 
Ill. 'YOO'S TEXTUALIST INNOVATION 
Yoo's work is indebted to a textualist approach that can be found in some 
recent scholarship on war powers,100 much of it inspired by Justice Scalia's 
approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation.101 These scholars argue 
that the best way to get at the original meaning of the Constitution is to try to 
understand what the constitutional text originally meant that is, how that text 
would have been understood by the eighteenth-century mind.102 The approach 
that tries to get at original intentions, say the textualists, is antidemocratic. Since 
the Constitution is, an agreement that was ratified through representative 
99. Irons's narrative of congressional and popular support for the United States' expansive 
foreign policy undercuts any possible claim that executive usurpation of congressional war powers is at 
the, root of American imp,erialism. See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 3, at 47 (suggesting that War of 1812, 
which Madison's critics dubbed "Mr. Madison's war," was one that Madison himself had tried to avoid 
and noting that "inflammatory newspaper reports" led American public to issue ~'heated calls for 
war"); id. at 89-90 (recounting President Cleveland's refusal to lead war against Spain despite 
congressional threat to declare war). 
100. Recent scholarship exemplifying a textual approach to war powers includes an exchange 
between Michael Ramsey and John Yoo: Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, and Yoo, War and the 
Constitutional Text, supra note 8; as well as Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, and Saikrishna 
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 ·YALE L.J. 231 
(2001). 
101. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MA ITER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22-23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The text is the law, and it is the 
text that must be observed., I agree with Justice Holmes[] .. .. : 'We do not inquire what the legislature 
meant; we ask only what the statute, means."'). 
102. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 107 (arguing for controlling significance of constitutional text in 
ratification debates, ,since those who ratified Constitution had only constitutional text and not 
legislative history that was published later); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 100, at 234 n.1 ("[W]e 
think the best evidence of the meaning of a text is to see how intelligent and engaged people at the 
time it was written commonly understood the words it employs."); Ramsey, Textualism,.supra note 71, 
at 1553-54 ("[M]odern theories of original understanding focus much less on a reconstructed or 
subjective Framers' intent and much more on the objective meaning of the constitutional text, as it 
would have been understood at the time it was written."). 
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processes, it ought not to bind its ratifiers to intentions that are not manifest in 
the constitutional text itself.103 Rather, the constitutional text should bind U.S. 
citizens to what an ordinary reader at the time would likely have understood the 
text to mean. 104 
One can and others have raised numerous objections to this textualist 
approach to both statutory and constitutional interpretation.105 With respect to 
war powers, however, those criti~isms seem beside the point. Whether one 
attempts to establish the meaning of the Constitution through a reconstruction of 
the intentions of the Framers or through an inquiry into the meaning of the 
constitutional text, one can arrive at the same results. While there might be areas 
where the Framers' intentions and textual meaning diverge, the war power is not 
one.106 The traditional perspective is largely a product of the intentionalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, 107 and it arrives at the conclusion that 
103. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 27-28 ("[T]his book focuses on the Framers' beliefs and actions in 
the ratification process because the Constitution was the result of a democratic political process. 
Ratification by popularly elected conventions gave the Constitution its political legitimacy."). 
104. See id. at 28 ("What those who ratified the Constitution believed the meaning of the text to 
mean is therefore more important than the intentions of those who drafted it."); Ramsey, Textualism, 
supra note 71, at 1555 ("[T]he inquiry is not what any individual member of the constitutional 
generation intended, or even our best guess as to what that generation collectively intended; it is, 
instead, the best reading of the text."). 
105. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (1990) 
(arguing that, despite Scalia's beliefs, Constitution does not favor "new textualism" more than other 
interpretation schemes); William D. Popkin, An ulnternal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1173-86 (1992) (rejecting Scalia's argument that public 
respect for courts is eroded when courts depart from textualist approach and inquire into legislative 
intent); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 15 B.U. L. REV. 321, 383-85 (1995) (developing 
positive account of methodology of textualism, as opposed to viewing textualism simply as critique of 
intentionalism, but concluding that textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial 
discretion in statutory or constitutional interpretation); David Sosa, The Unintentional Fallacy, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA'ITER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)) 
(arguing that indeterntinacy in statutory language undermines textualist project and that textualist 
project becomes even more suspect when refined to originalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's 
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 564-65 (1997) (reviewing SCALIA, supra) (defending 
common law approach to constitutional law as embodying "judicial modesty," allowing for flexibility 
and as preferable to Scalia's approach in terms of accommodating democratic ideals). 
106. As the discussion to follow will indicate, the two approaches are not as divergent as they 
may appear, since textualists rely on the same sources of information to establish the most likely 
meaning of the constitutional text to the eighteenth-century mind as the intentionalists rely on to 
establish the Framers' intentions~ See, e.g., Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1569 (conceding that 
"views of the drafters and their contemporaries ... are nonetheless an important interpretive tool" for 
textualists ). 
107. Although the traditional perspective does pay careful attention to the constitutional text, the 
bulk of the argument relies on extensive quotations from the Framers setting out their understanding 
of the meaning of that text. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 27, at 3-5 (relying on Framers' statements in 
concluding that declaring war is power vested in Congress); FISHER, supra note 27, at 3-14 (marshalling 
evidence from annals of Constitutional Convention, ratification debates, and correspondence of 
Framers); WORMUTH ET AL., supra note 27, at 17-19 (reviewing legislative history and ratification 
debates relating to Declare War Clause); id. at 108-10 (reviewing legislative history and ratification 
debates relating to Commander in Chief Clause). Reveley devotes a chapter to the constitutional text. 
• 
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the Declare War Clause was intended to give Congress authority to commence 
hostilities; whether by formal declaration or otherwise.108 Although Yoo 
disagrees, a textualist account of the constitutional allocation of war can lead to 
the same conclusion.109 
If one is accustomed to the traditional approach to war powers, Yoo's 
approach can be disorienting~ Rather than proceeding from a discussion of the 
text to a discussion of what the Framers said about the text, Y oo begins with his 
synopsis of the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers on the 
appropriate allocation of war powers in a constitutional monarchy.110 There 
follows a discussion of the practice. of the colonies and the states during the so-
called "Critical Period" before the ratification of the Federal Constitution.111 
Yoo then asserts that the views of the actual authors of the Constitution are not 
the best guide to the meaning of the document.112 Rather, what really matters, 
Y oo argues, is what the ratifiers of the Constitution believed the Constitution 
meant insofar as we can tell.113 Having reviewed this historical material, Yoo 
concludes that the Constitution, properly understood against the background of 
REVELEY, supra note 27, at 29·50. But he devotes three to a discussion of the eighteenth-century 
background, the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification debates. /d. at 51-115. 
108. Irons devotes his first chapter to the Constitutional Convention. IRONS, supra note 3, at 11-
27. He does not devote nearly as much space to the ratification debates and Weighs the evidentiary 
value of utterances in those debates no differently from later statements regarding the meaning of the 
Constitution. See id. at 25 ("The debates in the convention, the later writings of delegates to that 
meeting, and speeches in the state conventions that voted on ratification of the Constitution leave no 
doubt that the president's title and role as commander in chief gave him no powers that Congress 
could not define or limit."). 
109. See Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71,. at 1609 (stating that text, structure, and ratification 
debates support congressional power to initiate war "through words ... or action" because ''declare 
war" has ambiguous textual meaning from eighteenth·century viewpoint). 
110. Yoo, supra note 4, at 30-54. 
111. /d. at 55-87. 
112. See id. at 107 (noting that Madison's notes on Constitutional Convention were not available 
to ratifiers, who could rely only on text itself and on their knowledge of political and constitutional 
history, and calling ratification debates "perhaps the most important source for understanding the 
Constitution"). Yoo's position on the significance of the ratification debates is not unusual. The 
argument in favor of privileging the history of ratification over that of the Philadelphia Convention 
goes back to James Madison but has recently been revived by the historian Jack Rakove and by legal 
scholars such as Charles Lofgren and Bruce Ackerman. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: 
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2126-27 & nn.139-40 (1999) (reviewing original and modem views on 
privileging ratification debates over those at Constitutional Convention). 
113. Y oo acknowledges that there are difficulties associated with using the ratification debates as 
a source for getting at the Constitution's meaning, but he does not fully acknowledge the nature of 
those-difficulties. Yoo, supra note 4, at 107~ As one of Yoo's critics points out,. '~we have records of 
only some of these conventions, and the records that do exist are abysmal." Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Laughing at Treaties; 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2162 (1999); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN TilE MAKING OF TilE CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) (noting problems 
with relying on ratification debates, for example, "spotty" manner of reporting on de_bates and 
"obscure" participants in debates and concluding that only definite conclusion drawn from debates is 
ratifiers' preference for Constitution over Articles. of Confederation). 
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eighteenth-century political theory,114 "does not establish a fixed process for 
foreign relations decisionmaking"115 and thus "provide[ s] the political branches 
with far more flexibility in managing foreign relations than is commonly 
assumed.'; 116 
A. Political 'Theory and the Constitutional Text 
In the war powers context, textualism arises as a critique of the traditional 
perspective's characterization of the Constitution as riddled with lacunae on the 
subject of the foreign affairs power.117 Textualism sets out to show that "there 
are no gaps in the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers. "118 
Textualism can make this argument because part of its agenda has been an 
expansive reading of executive authority; a reading that can fill any gaps in the 
constitutional enumeration of the powers of the federal government by· 
allocating such powers to the executive.119 According to this textualist view, the 
Constitution enumerates only the powers associated with executive power that 
were transferred to Congress~ 120 According to Y oo and other textualists, the 
"lacunae" identified by the traditional perspective reflect eighteenth-century 
assumptions that the powers in question are executive in nature. 
1. Political Theory and Practice 
. . 
The scope of Y oo's historical perspective on the framing of war powers is 
impressive, encompassing "the British constitution in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, state constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation. "121 
Yoo's great innovation is to develop the argument that there was a consensus 
. . 
among eighteenth-century politicians and political theorists about the proper 
114. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that his book "concentrates less on judicial precedent 
and more on constitutional text, structure, and history .... [and] begins by telling the story of the place 
of foreign affairs in the development of the American constitutional system during the late eighteenth 
centuryn). 
115. /d. at 7-8. 
116. /d. at 8. 
117. See; e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 14-15 (cataloguing myriad foreign 
relations power questions left unaddressed in Constitution); REVELEY, supra note 27, at 31-49 
(discussing Constitution's "ill-defined, frequently competitive provisions" as well as "gaps in the war-
power provisions"). At times, Yoo seems to adopt the "gap theory," at least with respect to the foreign 
affairs power. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 24 (acknowledging that significant details regarding foreign 
affairs power are absent from Constitution's text). 
118. Prakash & Ramsey; supra note 100, at 236. 
119. See, e.g.; Yoo, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that British approach to foreign affairs, 
constitutional ratification events; and views of Federalists and Anti-Federalists led to understanding in 
·eighteenth century that executive retained "war and treaty powers"); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
100, at 234 (interpreting Article II, Section 1 of Constitution as vesting '"residual' foreign affairs 
power" in executive); Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1568 (summarizing textualist position that 
executive has "foreign affairs power'' that textually is not allocated elsewhere in Constitution). 
120. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 18 (asserting that executive, under Article II, retains power it once 
enjoyed that has not been explicitly delegated elsewhere). 
121. /d. at 27. 
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allocation of war powers between the executive and the legislature, a consensus 
that he finds reflected in these diverse sources: 
Both political theory, as primarily developed by thinkers such as 
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, and shared Anglo-American 
constitutional history from the seventeenth century to the time of the 
framing, established that foreign affairs was the province of the 
executive branch of government. Thus, when the Framers ratified the 
Constitution, they would have understood that Article II, Section I 
continued the Anglo-American constitutional tradition of locating the 
foreign affairs power generally in the executive branch.122 
According to Y oo, while the Framers understood war and treaty powers to rest 
with the executive, they followed the British model in giving the legislature 
power over funding so as to check the executive.123 The management of foreign 
relations_ thus was "dynamic," based on the interaction between the political 
branches.124 
The Frame_rs' understanding of the dynamic relation between the political 
branches would be supported, says Yoo, by the political theorists who were. most 
widely read and influential at the time. Grotius and Vattel, for example, placed 
the foreign relations power in the executive. They recognized that international 
agreements that transfer sovereign powers may not be made unilaterally by the 
executive but require approval of the legislature.125 Yoo discusses Locke's -notion 
of executive prerogative, which would permit the executive to act "'without the 
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it'"126 and implies that the 
doctrine was incorporated sub silentio into the Constitution. Locke and 
Montesquieu both believed that the executive exercised sole power over foreign 
affairs through what Locke called the "federative'' power .127 While 
Montesquieu recognized legislative checks on executive foreign affairs power-
through the power of the purse and through its power to disband the army-
neither Locke nor Montesquieu envisioned the judicial branch as having any role 
in foreign affairs.128 Blackstone likewise considered "warmaking and 
treatymaking powers as part of the royal prerogative," while allowing for 
legislative checks through the power of impeachment.129 Although the British 
King seemed to have sovereign control over foreign affairs, during the 
' . 
eighteenth century, Parliament, through its power over domestic legislation and 
122. /d. at 19. 
123. /d. at 30-31. 
124. /d. at 31. 
125. Yoo, supra note 4, at 34-36. 
126. /d. at 37 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 160 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690));see also id. at 44 (discussing Blackstone's version of 
notion of executive prerogative, which somewhat alters Locke's theory). 
127~ /d. at 37-40 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 126, § 146). 
128. /d. at 39-40. 
129. YoO,sL~pra note 4, at 44. 
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the power of the purse, exerted "a more direct influence over foreign policy than 
the formal allocation of constitutional powers would suggest. "130 
This aspect of Yoo's argument has been criticized in two ways. First, some 
scholars simply dismiss the relevance of seventeenth-- and eighteenth-century 
political theory and the practice of the British monarchy on the ground that "the 
framers consciously departed from so much of it. "131 It is safe to predict that 
Irons would be in this camp, as he provides myriad quotations from the Framers 
. . . . 
indicating their hostility to the notion of an executive empowered with war 
powers akin to the "prerogative" of English kings.132 As James Wilson put it, 
"'The prerogatives of the British Monarchy' . . . were not 'a proper guide in 
defining the executive powers. Some of the prerogatives were of a legislative 
nature. Among others that of war and peace.'"133 
Other scholars have objected to Yoo's reading of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century background as oversimplified and thus incorrect.134 
According to these scholars, Y oo and other textualists have_ postulated a 
consensus regarding notions of executive powers where none ex.isted.135 Michael 
Ramsey, Curtis Bradley, and Martin Flaherty review seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century political theory and conclude that there was no consensus 
among such theorists as to where the power to make war was to be vested.136 In 
addition, Ramsey points out that the English Constitution was not the only 
130. /d. at 54 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
131. Cole, supra note 9, at 8; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 572 (criticizing those 
who argue for expansive executive powers based on Article Il's Vesting a a use as erring "dramatically 
in [the] presumption that America's constitutional practitioners mechanically applied European 
political and legal theory"). 
132. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 20 (noting Charles Pinckney's concern that giving President 
responsibility over "'peace and war .•. would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, to 
wit an elective onem); id. (noting John Rutledge's opposition to "'giving [the executive] the power of 
war and peace"'); id. (noting James Madison's view that "'executive powers ... do not include the 
rights of war and peace ... but should be confined and defined if large we should have the evils of 
elected Monarchies'"). 
133. /d. (quoting James Wilson, who spoke against incorporating British government into U.S. 
Constitulion). 
134. See Bradley & Flaherty,. supra note 62, at 572 ("[E]xecutive-power essentialists have painted 
too simplistic a picture of the relevant eighteenth-century political, constitutional, and legal thought."). 
See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) ("Where the interpretivist seeks clarity and 
definiteness, the historian finds ambiguity."). 
135. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 559 (argu.ing that neither constitutional text nor 
historical evidence supports the_ory that Article II's Vesting Clause can be read as grant of plenary 
foreign affairs powers to executive); Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 11, at 1701~ (noting that 
history, by itself, cannot shed most meaningful light on what constitutional text signifies). 
136. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 560.;71 (canvassing writings of John Locke, 
William Blackstone, Baron de Montesquieu, Thomas Rutherforth, Jean de Lolme, Jean Jacques 
Burlamaqui, Samuel Puffendorf, Hugo Grotius, and Emmerich de Vattel and finding no consensus on 
which branch of government should wield foreign affairs powers); Ramsey, Text and History, supra 
note 71, at 1701-02 & n.58 (arguing that Yoo constructs argument of historical inevitability based on 
"selective emphasis'; and that none of leading historians on whom Yoo relies has endorsed his view of 
executive war powers). 
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model that influenced the Framers. The Roman Republic was also a significant 
model, and under that system, at least in theory, the power to initiate war was 
vested in the legislature.137 
2. State Constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and the Ratification 
Debates 
Y oo's account of the significance of state constitutions during the 
revolutionary period is heavily indebted to the work of Gordon Wood.138 
Wood's argument, as summarized by Yoo, is that the American colonists were 
chastened when their early experiments in increased democracy "produced 
chaos, leading some states to adopt admired constitutions that returned power to 
the executive branch."139 While Thomas Jefferson advocated reining in executive 
power in state constitutions, John Adams's approach prevailed. Yoo concludes: 
While the Revolution may have represented a rebellion against the 
presence of the Crown, it was not an assault on the traditional 
relationship between the executive and legislature. As under the royal 
governors, the common practice of the states. either assumed that the 
governors had broad warmaking authority, or explicitly gave them such 
power in terms reminiscent of the British constitution and the colonial 
charters.140 
South Carolina's Constitution, which imposed substantive limitations on 
executive war powers; was an exception;141 but according to Yoo, this exception 
"underscores the common presumption that such powers lay with the 
executive. "142 
Here, as in other con texts, Y oo argues by negative implication: "If the 
Framers had wanted to prevent the president from commencing war without 
congressional approval, ... they could have adopted a provision not unlike South 
Carolina's. ''143 But that argument is unconvincing, as one could also point to 
137. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note. 71, at 1699~1700 (discussing influence of Roman 
Republic and John Adams's writings on Roman Constitution, which demonstrate that "at least in 
theory," Roman legislature controlled declarations of war). 
138. See, e.g., Yoo,supra note 4, at 29 (citing work of Wood, Bernard Bailyn, Forrest McDonald, 
and Jack Rakove as sources for his understanding of intellectual context of Revolution); id. :at 36 
(following Wood's and Bailyn's views on influence of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone on 
revolutionary generation)~ 
139. Yoo; War an,d the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1648; see also Yoo,supra note 4, at 63 
(asserting similar argument that states chose to sustain ''the executive's traditional powers" as opposed 
to distributing power structurally). 
140. Yoo,supra note 4, at 65. 
141. See id. at 72 (noting that South Carolina was only state to substantively limit war power of 
exe.cutive ). 
142. /d. at 86. 
143. /d. at 72; see also id. at 148 ("If the Framers had intended to grant Congress the power to 
commence military hostilities, they could easily have imported the phrase from the Articles of 
Confederation into the Constitution, as they did with other, related powers."); Yoo, supra note 4, at 
153 ("If the Framers had sought to establish a system that requires ex ante congressional approval .... 
Article II, Section 2 should have included an additional clause that the president 'shall have Power, by 
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express language granting state governors war powers, which the Framers did 
not incorporate into the Constitution~ 144 Nor did they adopt language from 
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation and grant the President "the sole and 
exclusive right and power of deterrnining on peace and war."145 
Moreover, Yoo's argument that there was a "common presumption" that 
war powers lay with the executive is undercut by his own narrative, which 
indicates that the issue was a subject of considerable debate. That being the case, 
one cannot blithely fill lacunae in the Constitution with a presumption in favor of 
executive authority .146 In any case, Y oo fails to demonstrate that colonial 
charters and state constitutions reflect in an intelligible way on the emerging 
sense among the Framers of the proper allocation of war powers on the federal 
level. Yoo provides no evidence that state. constitutional experience played any 
determinative role in the ratification debates over war powers. He gives no 
consideration to the possibility that Anti-Federalist fear of a centralized federal 
and with the advice and consent of Congress, to engage in War.'''). One reviewer of Yoo's work has 
criticized such arguments by negative implication as '"when the dog doesn't bark' statements." David 
J. Bederman, Recent Books on International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 490,492 (2006) (reviewing Yoo, 
supra note 4). Bederman points out that Yoo ignores arguments by negative imp1ication that would 
undercut his pQsition that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing. Bederman concludes, 
"Yoo's dog is well trained; itbarks only on his command." Id. 
144. One example is New Hampshire's 1784 constitution: 
The president ... shall have full power by himself~ or by any chief commander, or other 
officer,-or officers ..• to train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia and navy; and for the 
special defence and safety of this state to assemble in martial ,array, and put in warlike 
posture, the. inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them to encounter, 
expulse, repel, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within and 
without the limits of this state; and also to kill slay, destroy, if necessary~ and conquer by all 
fitting ways, enterpriz~ and means, all ~nd every such person and persons as shall, at any 
time hereafter, in a hostile manner, attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, 
detriment, or annoyance of this state .... 
N.H. CONST. pt. II (1784), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2463-64 (Frances Ne,wton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
Massachusetts's 1780 constitution was nearly identical. MASS. CONST. ch. II, § 1, art. VII, reprinted in 3 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 0TIIER ORGANIC LAWS, 
supra, at 1901. 
145. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1777). Yoo's discussion of the Articles of 
Confederation is riddled with baffling contradictions. The Articles pose a problem for Y oo, since 
under the Articles all national powers were vested in the Continental Congress. See Yoo, supra note 4, 
at 73 (noting that "the Articles vested all national powers in the Continental Congress, including those 
over war and peace"). But one should not think of the Continental Congress as a legislature, says Yoo; 
it was in fact the national government's executive branch. /d. at 74. "Legislative powers even in the 
foreign affairs arena remained with the state assemblies.', /d. (emphasis added}. On the same page, 
however,- Yoo states that "the Articles transferred all foreign affairs powers to the Continental 
Congress." ld. (emphasis added). On the next page, Yoo states that nthe Congress exercised a mixture 
of judicial, legislative-, and executive functions." /d. at 75. 
146. Yoo has argued that because Article Irs Vesting Oause is not limited in the way Article I's 
Vesting aause is, "any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature, such as the. 
power to conduct military hostilities, must be resolved in favor of the executive branch.'' Yoo, War 
and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1677. But no such resolution ·is possible if the presumption 
in favor of executive war powers did not obtain in the eighteenth century. 
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government would lead the Framers to constrain federal exe_cutive power-
especially in the area of war making in ways they did not think necessary with 
respect to state executive power. In fact, the Framers freely and repeatedly 
expressed their desires to minimize executive war powers.l47 
The historical record on the eighteenth-century view of executive power is 
confused enough to permit differing conclusions. Martin Flaherty and Curtis 
Bradley review the experience of the American states in the revolutionary and 
critical periods.148 They find no evidence to support the thesis that people 
steeped in political theory of the framing period would simply assume executive 
control over the powers of war and peace.149 Rather, Flaherty and Bradley argue 
that when some states moved "to enhance the independence and authority of the 
executive branch, "150 they did so not because they thought that certain powers 
were inherently executive in nature but for the pragmatic reason of providing a 
check on the legislature. Tbe actual allocation of executive power was, say 
Flaherty and Bradley, "specific and functional rather than categorical and 
essentialist. "151 
Yoo chastises John Hart Ely, Harold Koh, and Jack Rakove for ignoring 
the ratification debates.152 But Y oo's use of these debates appears selective, and 
the selection tendentious. Y oo contends that, since the ratifiers did not have 
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, they had to rely on "the 
background of Anglo-American political and constitutional history of the 
preceding century," which featured not "the enfeebled governors of many of the 
early state constitutions ... [but] a rejuvenated presidency."153 The result, Yoo 
claims, is a Constitution in which "the president played the primary role in war 
and a significant, if not primary, role in determining peace. Customary executive 
power over foreign affairs had returned to a unitary, energetic executive, but one 
that took the form of a republican president rather than a hereditary 
monarch. "154 
This argument is based in part on 'Yoo's claim that Virginia was the "key 
state" in the ratification process, and thus, that the debate there "powerfully 
suggests what original meaning we should attach to the relative roles of the 
president, Senate, and Congress in wielding the foreign affairs power. "155 As a 
political matter, it is true that without ratification in Virginia, the constitutional 
147. See supra_ notes 67-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of various Framers' views of 
limiting executive powers. 
148. Bradley &_Flaherty, supra note 62, at 571-85. 
149. /d. at 581 (noting that the "pattern [in state constitutions] -strong legislatures and limited 
and defined executive powers extended to foreign affairs"). 
150. /d. at 584. 
151. /d. at 585. 
152. Yoo,supra note 4, at 106-07. 
153. /d. at 107., 
154. Id. at 107-08. 
155. /d. at 140-41. 
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enterprise would have been shaky if not doomed.156 It is also the case that the 
Virginia debate featured an extraordinary collection of both Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists and a rousing debate on war powers. Still, given Yoo's 
contractarian views on the significance of the ratification debates, 157 it is peculiar 
for him to argue that the tenth state to ratify should have some decisive role in 
• 
determining the meaning of the Constitution. After all, the other participants in 
the ratification process were no more privy to the Virginia ratification debates 
than they were to Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention. 
In any case, with respect to war powers, Yoo's discussion of the debates 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists seems to miss the point. Anti-
Federalists criticized the draft Constitution on the ground that it gave too much 
power to the executive.158 The Federalists' response was not to defend the 
unitary executive but to highlight the limits of executive power under the 
Constitution.159 Yoo contends that, in the war powers debate, the Federalists 
engaged in a conscious "strategy of exaggerating the British King's powers and 
intentionally distorting Anti-Federalist arguments .. "160 As Jack Rakove has 
noted, however, one can recognize the political and rhetorical context in which 
various statements were made without dismissing "all statements on either side 
of the question as so much propaganda .. "161 The ratification debates strongly 
suggest that neither Federalists nor Anti-Federalists favored an expansive 
executive.162 They differed only in their estimation of how successfully the 
Constitution had fettered that branch of the federal government. 
156. See id. at 131-32 (citing views of Alexander Hamilton and Forrest McDonald on importance 
of ratification .in Virginia). 
157. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 107 (arguing that ratification debates "carr~ed the greatest polit~cal 
legitimacy1' and forced Federalists "to explain the meaning of specific constitutional provisions and 
how they would work"). 
158. See id. at 111 (''To Anti-Federalists, both president and king held the same powers over wat 
and peace, and thus threatened the same tyranny."). An interesting1 though different, take was that of 
Patrick Henry in the "key" Virginia ratification debates. Henry criticized the Constitution on the 
ground that it gave Congress all war powers. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 172 (1.836) (''The 
Congress can both declare war and carry it on, and levy your money, as long as you have a shilling to 
pay/'). Henry clearly did not share Yoo's assumptions about war powers being inherently executive in 
nature. 
159. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that Federalists in New York ratification debate 
"stressed the fonnal differences between the American and British plans of government," contrasting 
"powers of the king, and the relative weakness of the president"). 
160. /d. 
161. RAKOVE,supra note 113, at 17. 
162. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, at 1712 (noting that when Anti-.Federalists 
complained about scope of presidential authority, "Federalists responded by saying that the 
President's powers were not as great as the Anti-Federalists supposed"). 
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• 
• 
B. Yoo's Textual Analysis 
Because he thinks an expansive reading of Congress's war powers is 
inconsistent with the notion of executive power as understood in the eighteenth 
century, Yoo rejects the traditional perspe-ctive's textual argument regarding 
congressional war powers. His textual argument has two components an 
expansive reading of Article II's Vesting Clause and a narrow reading of Article 
I's enumeration of congressional war powers. 
Yoo's argument in favor of executive war powers is simple and 
straightforward. Because the Constitution states that "executive power shall b'e 
vested" in the President, the best way to understand the constitutional text is as a 
grant of all executive powers, as those powers would have been understood in 
the eighteenth century.163 Since Yoo argues that informed people at the time of 
the Constitution's ratification would have assumed that foreign affairs powe'rs 
are executive in nature, "Article II effectively grants to the president any 
unenumerated foreign affairs powers not given elsewhere to the other 
branches. "164 For the reasons given in Part III.A.l; supra, this Essay has argued 
that Y oo's reading of Article Il's Vesting Clause is unpersuasive.165 
Yoo is at his most brilliant in fashioning creative textual and structural 
arguments for a narrow reading of congressional war powers. Here too, however, 
the arguments, while interesting, are not convincing enough to overcome the 
clear statements of the Framers and the-practice of the early republic, both of 
which uniformly suppor.t congressional primacy in decision-making processes 
relating to the advent of hostilities. 
163. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) ("The 
executive power was given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was 
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed .... ~'); 
Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, GAZE'I"I'E U.S., June 29, 1793, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969) ("The general doctrine_ then of :our 
constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the 
exceptions and qu[a}lifications which are expressed in the instrument."). The difference between the 
Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses has recently been called into question. See Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein; The President and the Administration, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 47-50 (1994) (arguing 
that Vesting Clause of Article_ II implicitly includes "herein granted" provision similar to that of 
Vesting Qause of Article I). For an extended refutation of Lessig and Sunstein and a defense of the 
theory of a unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power 
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
164. Yoo, supra note 4, at 18. 
165. In addition to the historical arguments of Bradley and Flaherty discussed supra, those 
opposing the Vesting Oause thesis have telied on Justice Jackson~s opinion in the Steel Seizure case: 
"[I]t is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some 
trifling ones." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co .. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 64041 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). In the same vein, Bradley and Flaherty explain that ''the Founders' decision 
to list what they meant by 'executive Power' would tend to suggest, pursuant to the expressio unius 
canon, that their list was complete, rather than merely illustrative." Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, 
at 555. 
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Yoo focuses his discussion of Article I on the Declare War Clause. He has 
very little to say about Congress's other enumerated powers.166 Relying on 
Samuel Johnson's English dictionary, Yoo concludes that the phrase "declare 
war" connotes "recogniz[ing] a state of affairs· ·clarifying the legal status of the 
nation's relationship with another country rather than authoriz(ing] the 
creation of that state of affairs. "167 Y oo then professes puzzlement at the· 
different language used in Article I, Section 8, which grants Congress the power 
to "declare War,'' and in Article I, Section 10, which provides that the states may 
not "engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will 
not admit of delay."168 Yoo points out that the language in Section 10 creates 
precisely the allocation of war powers "between Congress and the states" that 
the traditional perspective would like to establish "between Congress and the 
president. "169 This shows the difficulties of the traditional approach, says Yoo, 
"because it requires us to believe that the Framers did not know how to express 
themselves in one part of the Constitution but did in another part of the 
Constitution on exactly the same subject. " 170 
There is a methodological difficulty here because Yoo's reading of the 
Declare War Clause treats it in isolation and thus ignores an important element 
of the constitutional structure, which grants Congress numerous war powers.171 
But it is not really so hard to imagine why the Framers would prefer "declare" in 
Article 1, Section 8 but "engage~' in Article 1, Section 10. The Constitution 
provides that the states have no power to declare war, but also that they may not 
engage in war, unless in response to an invasion. Parallel construction could not 
have achieved the desired effect here without significantly infringing on the 
President's power to repel sudden attacks that do not rise to the level of 
invasion.172 
In addition, Yoo himself provides two strong arguments for the choice of 
"declare" in Article 1, Section 8. First, Yoo recognizes that "in times of declared 
war, certain actions by the federal government would survive strict scrutiny but 
166. Yoo provides a brief discussion of "letters of marque and reprisal'' and concludes that they 
refer only to "one species of commercial warfare." Yoo, supra note 4, at 147-48. 
167. /d. at 145 (citing 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICl'IONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. 
Strahan ed., 1755)). Michael Ramsey reads Johnson's dictionary as permitting a broader 
understandi11;g of "declare'' to include "to· 'make known''' through action. See Ramsey, T~tualism, 
. . 
supra note· 71, at 1590-91 (interpreting definition of "declare" as including declaration of war "by 
action" as well as "by proclamation"). David Cole points out that, even in the eighteenth century, the 
phrase: "declare war" was a legal term of art referring to "both the commencement of hostilities and .. 
. officially recognizing that war was ongoing." Cole, supra note 9, at 9. 
168. Yoo,supra note 4,at 146 (quoting U.s~ CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 3). 
169. ld 
170. ld. • 
171. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text outlining constitutional provisions granting 
various powers to Congress pertaining t.o war. 
172. See Ramsey, Text and History, supra note 71, at 1706-07 (arguing that, because restrictions 
on President's war powers are not same as restrictions on states' war powers, the different language in 
two clauses is perfectly reasonable). 
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would certainly fail if attempted in peacetime. "173 Thus, even if Congress's 
power to declare war does not constrain the executive's powers as commander in 
chief, it does constrain the President and hold him to his oath to defend the 
Constitution and implement the laws of the United States. States have no such 
power, and so the word "declare" has no place in Article 1, Section 10. 
Second, Yoo's discussion of the Declaration of lndependence174 illustrates 
how the efficacy of congressional declarations of war could go beyond mere 
recognition of an existing state of war. The Declaration, Yoo tells us, "did not 
'authorize' military resistance to Great Britain."175 Rather, it "announced the 
legal relationship between the mother country and its former colonies."176 It is 
not surprising that the Declaration did not create a state of war between Great 
Britain and its former colonies. Its purpose was to declare independence, not 
war. What is noteworthy is that Yoo recognizes that the effect of the Declaration 
was not merely declaratory but transformative: "The Declaration's importance 
was not in authorizing combat, but in transforming the legal status of the 
hostilities between Great Britain and her colonies from an insurrection to a war 
between equals. "177 
As speech-act theory has long ,recognized, certain utterances are 
"performative. "178 Such utterances create states of affairs rather than reporting 
or commenting on them.179 Thus, Yoo recognizes that a congressional 
declaration of war could do more than merely grant official recognition to a 
preexisting condition; it could bring about a new state of affairs, one with both 
legal and political ramifications. 
Just as scholars who have undertaken historical research with a 
thoroughness that rivals Yoo's have disputed the accuracy of his arguments 
regarding eighteenth-century views of executive power, 180 such scholars have 
similarly disputed Yoo's arguments reg~rding the meaning of the Declare War 
Clause. In a lengthy article, Michael Ramsey looks not only to Grotius, Vattel, 
173. Yoo, supra note 4, at 151. In the book, Yoo does not explain how a declaration of war 
permits Congress to pass laws that it could not otherwise pass. In an earlier work, he has cited the 
notorious Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), decision as the sole support for his 
contention that "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group may be justified 
by (p]ressing public necessity." Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1673 n.l02 
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). But see Ramsey, Text and History, 
supra note 71, at 1692-93 (acknowledging possibility that governmental powers increase during 
wartime, though stating that "augmentation turns upon the war itself, not upon the proclamation"). 
174. Yoo,supra note 4, at 149-50. 
175. /d. at 149. 
176. /d. at 150. 
177. /d. 
178. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 6 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbsia eds., 
Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1975) (1962). 
179. /d. Austin provides some familiar examples: Saying "I do" in the context of a marriage 
ceremony; uttering the words "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth;' while smashing a bottle against 
the stem; writing in a will "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"'; and saying "I bet you 
sixpence it will rain tomorrow." /d. at 5. 
180. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 560-71. 
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Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone,-but also to Samuel Puffendorf, Matthew 
Hale, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Thomas 
Rutherforth, and Christian Wolff.181 Ramsey demonstrates that eighteenth-
century the-orists used the phrase "declare war" to signify both a formal 
proclamation that hostilities existed and the commencement of war through 
conduct182 
In a response to Ramsey's article, Yoo takes_ Ramsey to task for discussing 
political theorists whose influence on the Framers was negligible.183' Here, Yoo 
seems to misunderstand his own textualist project. As Ramsey points out, his 
argument that the evidence is conflicting regarding the eighteenth-century 
understanding of the phrase "declare war" shifts the burden of proof to Yoo and 
other textualists who claim that the phrase "declare war" could only be about 
written declarations rather than declarations through action.184 The textual 
advantage shifts to the argument in favor of congressional primacy in decision 
making relating to war. 
To argue, as Yoo does; that we should ignore theorists to whom the 
Framers did not specifically cite in the ratification debates is to return to an 
intentionalist approach and to reject the argument that the Constitution means 
what an informed eighteenth-century reader would understand it to mean. 
Ramsey's approach is truer to the textualist project, but he concludes that the 
text itself does not support a narrow interpretation of the Declare War Clause185 
and that recourse to extrinsic material is therefore justified.186 Ramsey contends 
that the extrinsic material fully supports the traditional perspective favoring 
congressional war powers, and Y oo does not argue otherwise-.187 
181. Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1570-96. 
182. See id. at 1596 ("There would have been nothing remarkable in using 'declare war' to mecm 
initiation of a state of war by sovereign action, as well as by proclamation.")~ Yoo concedes that "some 
eighteenth-century writers appeared to use the phrase 'declare war' to mean conimence war." Yoo, 
War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1660. 
183. See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1645-46 (contending that views of 
political theorists whose ideas did not influence framing generation are irrelevant). Ramsey 
convincingly argues that Y oo is wrong about the influence of the writers in question and shows lhat 
Yoo had in fact relied on the very same writers in some of his earlier work. Ramsey, Text and History, 
supra note 71, at 1690-91 & n.21. 
184. See Ramsey, Text and History; supra not~ 71, at 1686-87 (arguing that "Declare War Oause . 
. . is capable of a broad meaning" and thus Yoo ultimately fails to overcome his burden of proof). 
185., See Ramsey, Textualism, supra note 71, at 1602 ("In sum, the narrow meaning of declaring 
war does not proceed as satisfactory an account of the text and structural role of the Declare War 
Clause."). 
186. See id. at 1569 (discussing usefulness of looking to "views of the drafters and their 
contemporaries" to interpret textual meaning, .in order to "cross-check" interpretation). 
187. Yoo concedes that "[p)ractice plays an important interpretive role for the question of the 
proper allocation of war powers." Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1664; see also 
Yoo, supra note 4, at 234 ("While not as relevant as the records of the ratification debates,-
arguments and events after 1788 cannot have influenced the minds of those who adopted the 
Constitution in 1787 postratification evidence can show how the Constitution1s structures worked in 
practice."). Significantly, while he provides a discussion of twentieth-century practice; which could not 
possibly evidence the original meaning of the Constitution, Yoo does not incorporate a discussion of 
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In terms of the range of historical sources that Y oo consults and the 
sophistication with which he integrates primary and secondary historical source 
materials, ·Yoo's. scholarship is an improvement over that of an earlier generation 
of scholars. Yoo is always eager to point out the failings of other legal scholars' 
use of history.188 He acknowledges, however, that scholars such as William 
Treanor and Martin Flaherty, who "have brought more sophisticated historical 
methodology to the study of foreign affairs questions," nonetheless support the 
traditional perspective.189 At the very least, reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether the constitutional text, structure, and history support the traditional 
view of war powers. And where the text itself is not dispositive, legislative 
history and postratification practice provide significant evidence of the text's 
original meaning. That evidence overwhelmingly supports the traditional 
perspective on war powers. 
IV. YOQ'S REVISIONISM AND THE TREATY POWER 
Unlike his arguments relating to war powers, Yoo's analysis of the treaty 
power does not always favor executive unilateralism. While Yoo strongly 
advocates executive power to implement, interpret, and; if necessary, tern1inate 
treaties, he insists on a role for Congress in giving treaties domestic effect. Yoo 
thus provides an elegant solution to the practical problems raised by our 
constitutional separation of powers, which gives the President the power to bind 
the United States through treaties but generally favors congressional control of 
domestic legislation. Yoo has undertaken impressive research in an attempt to 
reconcile constitutional design with constitutional practice in the realm of the 
treaty power. It is not surprising that, in defending a view of the Constitution 
that accords with his policy prefere-nces for a strong executive and against the-
binding force of international law, Y oo cannot always provide convincing 
defenses of his positions based on constitutional text, structure, and history. 
A. Interactions of War Powers and the Treaty Power 
Y oo repeatedly states that he relies on "constitutional text, structure, and 
history."190 In fact, it is more accurate to say that be takes a historical approach 
to understanding the structure of the Constitution with respect to war powers 
and a structural approach to understanding the text of the Constitution with 
respect to foreign affairs. History and text play a role in Yoo's views on the 
treaty power because his reading of the Article II Vesting Clause underpins all of 
arguments and practice in the early republic into his treatment of the question of the constitutional 
allocation of war powers. 
188. See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1643-48 (criticizing historical 
methodology in Ramsey, Te.xtualism, supra note 71); Yoo, Clio at War, supra note 8, at 1171, 1179-91 
(criticizing John Hart Ely, Jane Stromseth, and Jules Lobel for their use of "law office history" in legal 
scholarship on war powers). 
189. Yoo, supra note 4, at 26. 
190. /d. at viii, 8; see also id. at 5 (stating that book studies "text, structure, and ratification 
history of the Constitution"). 
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his arguments. i 91 But the main focus here is. on one structural element of the 
Constitution separation of powers. Yoo's view is that the President has plenary 
powers over foreign affairs while Congress has plenary powers over domestic 
legislation.192 The President thus has the power to make, interpret, implement, 
and abrogate treaties. If Congress does not approve of the way the President 
exercises those powers, it may use its appropriations or other legislative power to 
deny executive decisions domestic effect.193 
Y oo's discussion of treaties begins with a transitional chapter that addresses 
the question of whether international treaties can require the United States 
either to commit its armed forces to hostilities or to refrain from the use of 
force. 194 On the first question, even some supporters. of congressional war 
powers have argued that the executive has the power under the UN Charter to 
commit the United States to participation in multinational military operations 
authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter.195 Yoo finds the argument 
irrelevant as, in his view, the President would have such constitutional authority 
even if the UN Charter did not exist.196 Moreover, based on the example of 
congressional inaction in the face of the arguably illegal NATO intervention in 
Kosovo authorized by President Clinton, Yoo contends that international law 
cannot constrain th,e President in the exercise of his constitutional war powers.197 
Y oo finds '~more interesting and difficult" the question of whether Congress 
is constitutionally obligated to support executive~authorized uses of force backed 
191. See id. at 183-84 ("Article II's Vesting Cause requires that we construe any ambiguities in 
the allocation of executive power in favor of the president."). 
192. See, e.g., id. at 18 (describing executive foreign affairs powers as ''plenary"); Yoo, supra 
note 4, at 183 (claiming that "the Framers understood the conduct of foreign ,affairs to be executive in 
nature, while the legislature controlled funding and domestic regulation"). 
193. See id. at 293 ("[F]oteign policy emerges from the interaction of the plenary powers of the 
' . 
different branches of government. Congress may set its powers ov~r funding and legislation against the 
president's Article II authorities in war and treatymaking and his structural advantages in wielding 
power, or the branches may choose to cooperate to reach foreign policy outcomes."). 
194. !d. at 143-81 (Chapter 5: War Powers for a New World). 
195. See David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Tran.sformation of 
War Powers, 10 U. COLO. L. REv. 1491, 1492-93 (1999) (stating that executive has "unilateral power to 
use armed force in United Nations collective security actions," yet asserting that power is restricted on 
several bases with Security Counsel sanction playing vital role); Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, 
Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police Action in Lieu of War.; 
uThe Old Order Changeth,, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 68, 74 (1991) (arguing that President has power to 
commit United States to participation in UN-authorized police actions without congressional 
approval). These positions are criticized in D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism that Isn't True? The Tenth 
Amendment and Executive War Power, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 135, 169·78 (2001). 
196. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 165 ("Because the president already has the domestic 
constitutional authority to initiate military hostilities without any authorizing legislation, he need not 
rely on treaty obligations for legal justification."). 
197. See, e.g., id. at 171 ("In neither Kosovo nor Iraq did international law impose a restraint on 
presidential action, nor were federal courts about to enforce treaty obligations so as to restrict the 
commander-in-chief power."); id. at 172 ("Kosovo provides a clear demonstration that presidents are 
not constitutionally or legally bound by intetnationallaw."). 
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by UN or NATO resolutions. 198 He notes that Alexander Hamilton favored the 
argument for binding Congress to implement U.S. treaty obligations as required 
under the Supremacy Clause.199 Yoo rejects this view, however, as "inconsistent 
with the balance struck by the Constitution between the executive and legislative 
powers. "200 
In a final section of his chapter on the interaction of war powers and the 
treaty power, Yoo recognizes one significant limitation on unilateral executive 
war powers. Although he contends that Presidents may freely ignore treaty 
obligations in pursuit of policy goals,2°1 in certain circumstances Presidents may 
not, in pursuit of policy goals, abide by a treaty requiring the use of force.202 
Specifically, Yoo criticizes President Clinton's willingness to commit American 
troops to fight in Kosovo under the command of non-U.S. officers.203 Yoo makes 
a very interesting textual argument, based on an analogy to the Supreme Court's 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence, which would seem to require that any 
commander of U.S. troops must be approved through the constitutional 
appointments process and be accountable to the executive.204 
Yoo's close textual reading is persuasive. If his analogy to the 
Appointments Clause is permitted, however, one wonders how U.S .. good-faith 
participation in any collective security regime would be possible. Y oo suggests 
that U.S. soldiers and officers acting under foreign command must be free to 
disobey orders.205 No military can operate under such conditions, as evidenced 
by the punishments, including death, provided under the U.S. Code of Military 
Justice for soldiers who disobey their officers.206 In any case, in the unlikely 
event that executive authority would be challenged in such a case, it is hard to 
see why a court would insist on viewing the U.S. soldiers as serving under foreign 
command rather than viewing them as seconded to a NATO or UN force, thus 
relieving the President of any constitutional constraints on command. 
With respect to other aspects of the interaction of treaty and war powers, 
Y oo abandons close textual readings and relies on the loosest form of structural 
argumentation. He insists, for example, that legislative power is the main 
structural check on executive powers contemplated in the constitutional 
198. /d. at 165-66. 
199. /d. at 166. 
200. Yoo,supra note 4, at 166-67. 
201. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for Yoo~s argument that the President has such 
power. 
202. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that external treaty obligations should not affect 
executive decision to use force). 
203. /d. at 173-77. Yoo calls Clinton's willingness to do so "unprecedented." /d. David Bederman 
has shown that, even on Yoo's evidence, it is not. See Bederman, supra note 143, at 494 (noting that 
Wilson placed American forces under French strategic command in World War I and that contingents 
of Continental Army were under French command during American Revolution). 
204. Yoo, supra note 4, at 176-77. 
205. /d. at 180 (noting that American commanders at policy, tactical, and strategic levels may 
contradict any orders that non-U.S. commanders give). 
206. ld. at 336-37 n.73 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-892 (2000)). 
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design.207 But numerous other structural arguments could find support in the text 
and history of the Constitution. One could argue that in the context of the treaty 
power; Congress's check on executive power is provided through the 
requirement that the Senate give its advice and consent. Once it has done so, 
Congress is bound to authorize funding for the treaties that have become law of 
the land, and it has consented to the participation of U.S. forces in military 
engagements authorized under such treaties, even if American soldiers would 
thereby be placed under foreign command. 
Clearly, one concern here for Yoo is that the judiciary could become 
involved in interpreting treaties and thus act as a check on executive foreign 
affairs powers. Y oo thinks that such a check "would expand the federal 
judiciary's authority into areas where it has little competence, where the 
Constitution does not textually call for its intervention, and where it risks 
defiance by the political branches. "208 It is hard to reconcile this contention 
either with the. constitutional text, which expressly grants the federal judiciary 
power over all cases arising under treaties,209 or with the practice in the early 
republic, in which courts quite often interpreted treaties, usually in ways that 
undercut the interpretations proffered by the government.210 
Moreover, Yoo's institutional competence argument is hard to square with 
his political career. The arm of the executive branch that is entrusted with 
interpreting and implementing treaties is the Department of State.21 1 When ·Yoo 
was in the Justice Department, however, he clashed with State Department 
lawyers about the extent to which the Geneva Conventions would apply to the 
war on terror.212 The Bush administration seems to have relied on the advice of 
207. See id . . at 167 (arguing that "Framers believed that the legislative power ... would provide a 
crucial constitutional and political check ·on executive power and policies" while treaty· making powers 
were executive's alone). 
208. /d. at 172. 
209. U.S .. CONST. art. III;§ 2, cl.l. 
210. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical 
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2007) (finding that government lost fourteen of 
nineteen federal cases decided between 1789 and 1838 in which treaty questions arose and concluding 
that judiciary's lack of deference to executive interpretations of treaties was consistent with Framers' 
views). 
211. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT 'MANUAL 2006/2007, at 298 (2006) (noting that lawyers in Office of Legal 
Adviser to Secretary of State "draft, negotiate and interpret treaties [and] international agreements .. 
., [and] represent the United States in meetings of international organizations and in international 
negotiations .... . [and] before international tribunals"); Website of the Office of the Legal Adviser; 
http://www.stat.e~gov/s/l/treaty (last visited June 3, 2007) (setting forth Legal Adviser's role in advising 
"other Department bureaus (including posts overseas), and other governmental agencies on all aspects 
of treaty law and procedure"). 
212. William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State under President George W. 
Bush, rejected Yoo's arguments that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because 
Afghanistan was a "failed state,'~ or because the President has the power under international law to 
suspend the United States; treaty commitments. See Unclassified Memorandum from William H. Taft, 
IV to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of the Legal Counsel, 4-12 (Jan. 11, 2002), 
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Yoo and others in the Justice Department, and not on the State Department, in 
determining what forms of interrogation constitute torture under international 
law.213 In the Hamdan v. Rumsfe[(fl14 case, the Supreme Court sided with the 
experts in the State Department and ruled that the Geneva Conventions will 
apply to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.2 l 5 When the substance of the now-
notorious "torture memos" were leaked to the press in January 2005, the Bush 
administration retreated , from its earlier position.216 These episodes hardly 
support Y oo's thesis that the executive branch is best positioned to provide 
dispositive rulings interpreting treaties. 
B. The Power to Interpret and Terminate Treaties 
Yoo contends that the structure of the Constitution suggests that the 
President has power to interpret, implement, and abrogate treaties. 217 Because 
the Constitution is silent on the subject,218 Yoo again argues by analogy to the 
Appointments Clause. As courts have consistently held that the President has 
the power to remove from office appointees who must be approved by the 
Senate, he must similarly be empowered to implement, interpret, and abrogate 
treaties that were approved by the Senate, even if the Senate differs on the 
matter.219 
Y oo's contention that the executive has the primary role in implementing 
treaties and thus engages on a daily basis in treaty interpretation seems beyond 
dispute. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that "[t]he 
President has authority to determine the interpretation of an international 
agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with .other 
':I 
states. "220 
The issue is whether the President should act unfettered in the area of 
interpretation, implementation, and abrogation, and Yoo here overstates the 
available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/Ol TaftMemo.pdf [hereinafter Taft 
Memo]. 
213. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. 
& POL'Y 455, 457-58 (2005). 
214. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
215. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (ruling that military commissions lacked power to proceed 
against petitioners, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, because rules governing such commissions violate 
Geneva Conventions). 
216. The Justice Department issued a new memo superseding its earlier memo and withdrawing 
its statement that "only pain equivalent to such harm as serious physical injury or organ failure 
constitutes torture." John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the uTorture Memos," UCBERKELEYNEWS,Jan. 
4, 2005, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/medialreleases/2005/01/0S_johnyoo.shtml. 
217. Yoo,supra note 4, at 182,..214 (Chapter 6: Interpreting and Ending Treaties). 
218. See id. at 182 ("[T]he constitutional text does not explicitly address a host of other questions, 
such as those surrounding treaty interpretation and ternrination .... "). 
219. ld. at 185-87. 
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(1) 
(1986). 
• 
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case for presidential unilateralism.221 While courts in recent years have tended to 
defer to the authority of executive interpretations of treaties, that result is not 
constitutionally mandated, as they did not do so in the early republic.222 
Moreover, while Y oo treats Goldwater v. Carter223 as establishing "that any 
presidential termination of a treaty would be unreviewable in the courts,"224 only 
four Justices signed onto the opinion that took that position.225 Four Justices 
rejected that position, and one Justice remained silent.226 
Nonetheless, Yoo would give the President a gap-filling role in treaty 
interpretation akin to the role of courts in interpreting statutes.227 But unlike 
courts interpreting statutes, the executive branch need not concern itself with the 
legislative history of the treaty it interprets.228 Legislative history should not 
guide treaty interpretation, Yoo contends, because where treaties must be 
approved by two-thirds of the Senate, the on-the-record comments of one 
Senator are even less persuasive than in the case of statutes, which require only a 
majority vote.229 This line of argument is extremely difficult to reconcile with 
Yoo's insistence, in the context of his arguments about war powers, that the 
221. See Taft Memo, supra note 212, at 9 n.16 (calling Yoo's view of executive authority in treaty 
matters "somewhat overstated" and noting that "neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court would 
agree that the President has plenary power over the interpretation of treaties and of international 
law"). Some treaties expressly permit unilateral denunciation, but the default rule is that absent such 
express provision or clear evidence that the parties intended to permit unilateral denunciation, 
unilateral denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty regime is a breach of international law. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
Yoo does not distinguish between withdrawals permitted by international law and withdrawals that 
would place the United States in violation of international law. 
222. See Sloss, supra note 210, at 1-2 (noting that Supreme Court recently stated that government 
agencies' treaty interpretations will be given great weight, but arguing that courts did not defer to 
executive in first fifty years of U.S. constitutional development). 
223. 444 u.s. 996 (1979). 
224. Yoo, supra note 4, at 190. 
225.. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
226. See id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Judicial Branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach 
a constitutional impasse."); id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (voting to "set the case for 
oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously deserves"). Yoo's characterization 
of Brennan's vote to affirm the D.C. Circuit court's dismissal of the case is misleading. Brennan would 
have dismissed on far narrower grounds than the D.C. Circuit's opinion indicated. See id. (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting application of political question doctrine to case, but voting to affirm based on 
President's "well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
governments"). 
227. Yoo, supra note 4, at 192-93. Curiously, Yoo gives no consideration to the role of 
international adjudicatory bodies in interpreting treaties. Treaties routinely provide for dispute 
resolution through neutral adjudicatory bodies. His claim that the U.S. executive should have 
authority to determine what a treaty means is akin to a rule that one party to a contract should have 
authority to determine what the contract means. 
228. Yoo argues against the authority of legislative history generally. See id. at 196 ("[T]he use of 
legislative history expands the judicial function beyond its proper boundaries."). 
229. /d. 
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ratification debates provide the most decisive evidence of the Constitution's 
original meaning. 230 
There are three major problems with Yoo's argument on treaty 
interpretation. First, Y oo's Appointments Clause analogy fails because 
appointments and treaties are fundamentally different. Under the Supremacy 
Clause, 231 a treaty, once enacted, is law, and under the Take Care Clause,232 the 
President is bound to execute the laws. An appointment is not law and binds no 
one, by operation of law. Yoo's argument hinges on his belief that the President 
is free to breach treaties as a matter of constitutional law, a position that is hard 
to square with the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause. 
Second, despite those constitutional clauses, Y oo gives no consideration to 
the internationally and domestically recognized mechanisms for treaty 
interpretation that are inconsistent with his views. International law requires 
giving effect to the intentions of the parties as embodied in the treaty's text, read 
in the context of the treaty's legislative history, and with an eye to the treaty's 
object and purpose.233 Courts generally recognize this approach as part of U.S. 
law.234 
Finally, Yoo attempts to defend his call for executive unilateralism in treaty 
interpretation with an appeal to democratic populism, calling the President the 
"head of the most democratically accountable branch in the national 
government" and maintaining that "the people can hold the president directly 
accountable for his interpretation of a treaty. "235 First, it is certainly not the case 
that the executive branch is more democratically accountable than the 
legislature. Other than the President, no member of the executive branch is 
democratically accountable at all.236 Moreover, even the President is not directly 
elected and also is not generally subject to dismissal for one or even for a series 
230. Curiously, Yoo relies on legislative history to defend his arch·textualism; "Part of the reason 
that the Framers established the two-thirds supermajority requirement for treaties was to render 
treaties difficult to make and to protect the interests of the states." /d. at 196. 
231. See U.S. CaNST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 11Ulde, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " (emphasis added)). 
232. See id. art. II, § 3 (requiring that President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed"). 
233. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, sup·ra note 221, arts. 31-32. 
234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 325 
cmt. a (1986) (noting that, while Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has not come into force 
for United States, "it represents generally accepted principles and the United States has also appeared 
willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis''); see also, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 
470 U.S. 392, 396, 400-03 (1985) (considering legislative history in interpreting Warsaw Convention 
relating to air transportation). 
235. Yoo,supra note 4, at 198. 
236. In another section of the book, Yoo indicates that the process of approving treaties and 
international agreements could be made more democratic if Congress were bypassed entirely and the 
President were pennitted to make such agreements alone. In support of this argument, Yoo contends 
that "the president ... (aside from the vice president) is the Of\e federal officer chosen by the entire 
electorate.'; /d. at 258. It is hard to imagine that, for example Dan Quayle, was "chosen by the entire 
electorate" to serve as Vice President. 
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of constitutional missteps. In any case, when it suits his argument, Y oo argues 
that the House of Representatives is "the most directly democratic part of the 
government,"237 a statement more in keeping with the constitutional design. 
C. Self-Executing and Non-Self~ Executing Treaties 
Y oo's structural approach to constitutional interpretation, which focuses on 
separations of foreign affairs powers and legislative powers, leads him to 
conclude that treaties must be presumptively non-self-executing~238 Otherwise, 
Yoo contends, legislative powers would be transferred to the executive and 
"treatymakers could regulate any area that lies within Article I's enumerated 
powers."239 Yoo here seeks to protect from executive encroachment not only 
congressional legislative powers but also the federalist principle embodied in the 
Tenth Amendment.240 
Yoo's separation of powers argument here seems weak. If Congress's 
appropriations power is sufficient to check executive war powers, why should a 
structural interpretation of the Constitution not permit the same check on 
executive treaty powers? Indeed, as Yoo acknowledges, Congress's ability to 
override a treaty through subsequent legislation is recognized under the "last-in-
time" doctrine.241 In any case, as Yoo knows from his own experience in the 
Justice Department, whether the Framers envisioned a strict separation between 
executive and legislative power, the reality is that the executive branch plays a 
237. /d. at 224. Elsewhere, Yoo calls the House "the most democratic body of government," id. at 
240, and calls Congress "the most popular branch of government." ld. at 244. Later, lte varies the 
theme, calling the House "the most popular part of the government" and referring to Congress and 
the executive as "the most democratic branches." Yoo,supra note 4, at 257. 
238. See id. at 217 (arguing that non-self-execution "harmonizes treaties with constitutional 
structure and maintains the important distinction between foreign relations and domestic 
lawmaking"). See generally id. at 21549 (Chapter 7: Treaties and the Legislative Power) (discussing 
Congress's role in formation of treaties). 
239. /d. at 218. As David Bederman has pointed out, Yoo's argument is rendered a bit confusing 
because he does not distinguish between self-execution that is, the notion that treaties automatically 
become U.S. law without congressional jmplementation and the question of whether a treaty gives 
rise to a private right of action enforceable in court. Bederman, supra note 143, at 494. For example, 
Yoo argues that neither the Constitution nor statutes are self-executing because not all rights arising 
under a statute give rise to a private right of action. Yoo, supra note 4, at 226; see also id. at 229 
(associating self-execution with court enforcement of treaties). 
240. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 221 ("Self-execution also would free the treatymakers and their 
legislative power from federalism limitations."). 
241. /d. at 225-26. One would expect Yoo to object to the last-in-time doctrine on the ground that 
it permits Congress to control foreign affairs. The fact that Y oo objects to it only to the extent that it 
permits a treaty to override a statute, id. at 226, suggests that his primary concern is not to defend a 
structural understanding of the Constitution, but to limit the impact of treaties as binding U.S. law. 
Yoo goes so far as to state that "Coilgres~, under the last .. in-time rule, also has the power to terminate 
treaties." /d. at 209. This is incorrect. Congress can override a treaty as a matter of domestic law, but 
as a matter of international law, Congress has no power to affect the United States' treaty obligations 
or to terminate those obligations. 
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central role in setting the legislative agenda and even in drafting legislation.242 
The strict separation between treaty powers and domestic legislative powers that 
Y oo asserts is part of the constitutional structure is nowhere to be found in 
constitutional practice. 
Moreover, Yoo is in this case inattentive to relevant textual and historical 
evidence that provides an alternative structural solution to the separation of 
powers problem that he identifies. As Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have 
shown, the Constitution grants the Senate power not only to consent to treaties 
but also to provide '~advice" in relation te treaties.243 Early practice suggests that 
both George Washington and the Senate believed that the Senate had 
constitutional power to advise the President as part of the tre-aty-making 
process.244 Practice has moved away from this original understanding of the 
Constitution, but Yoo might explore reviving the practice in order to reconcile 
constitutional practice with text, structure, and history. Still, Yoo seems here to 
be taking his separation of powers principles to extremes. By assuming that 
treaties are non-self-executing, Yoo would rob the executive of its power to 
make binding federal law through the treaty process. 
Yoo's federalism concerns are more interesting in this context. In Missouri 
v. Holland,245 the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate migratory 
birds through legislation passed pursuant to a bilateral treaty even if Congress 
would have lacked the power to regulate absent a treaty.246 As Yoo 
acknowledges, given the subsequent expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause 
powers, "there can be little doubt that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act would be 
constitutional without the need of a treaty" today.247 Still Yoo thinks that the 
case illustrates the "textual and structural difficulties created by the theory of 
self-execution'' because it gives the federal government a way to legislate in 
areas in which the Tenth Amendment would otherwise prevent such 
legislation. 248 
242. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
931, 983-1005 (1999} (chronicling presidential control of budget process since 1974). Yoo has argued 
that the Supreme Court read Congress's post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), too_ narrowly in Hamdan. Yoo claims that he had a hand in drafting 
the legislation and that he wrote it to grant the execUtive as broad an authorization as possible. Adam 
Liptak, The Court Enters the War, Loudly, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at 1. 
243. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting President power to make treaties "with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate"); Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 631 (noting that Founders 
seemed to envision that Senate would possess advisory role "beyond a mere affrrmative or negative 
vote"). 
244. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 62, at 634 ("[B]oth the Senate and the President 
understood that the Senate would consult with the President and give the President advice before 
treaties were finalized."). 
245. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
246. -Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when 
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the 
authority of the United States."). 
247. Yoo,supra note 4, at 222~23. 
248. ld. at 223. 
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For Yoo, the solution is to treat treaties as non-self-executing, requiring_ 
congressional implementation.249 But since Holland involved a challenge to 
implementing legislation, Yoo's solution would not address the issue. Rather, 
what Yoo must really want is a reversal of Holland and a rule that Congress's 
powers to implement treaties through legislation are coextensive with the Article 
I, Section 8 enumeration. Y oo presents good structural and practical arguments 
for why Holland undermines federalism,250 but David Golove has provided 
exhaustive historical and textual arguments supporting the decision,251 to which 
Y oo offers no response,. It is hard to see why structure should trump text and 
history in this instance. 
Indeed, Yoo's arguments on the self-execution of treaties have been 
criticized generally as being without support in the historical record.252 Jack 
Rakove concludes that "the framers were virtually of one mind" in assuming that 
the Supremacy Clause's statement that treaties are "supreme Law" meant that 
they were self-executing and enforceable in both state and federal courts.253 For 
both Rakove and Yoo, this unity of mind among the Constitution's drafters 
would not be dispositive if the ratification debates indicated a different "original 
understanding" of the Constitution. Martin Flaherty, however, has carefully 
scrutinized the ratification debates on this subject and concluded that "[i]f 
anything, the debates demonstrate that the Antifederalists had put the nation on 
notice about the consequence of self-executing treaties and that the requisite 
majorities of We the People ratified the proposal anyway."254 
D. Treaties and Other Inte-rnational Agreements 
In his final chapter on the treaty power, Yoo argues against the 
interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements and 
against treaty exclusivity that is, the notion that Article II's Treaty Clause 
provides the only lawful mechanism whereby the Untied States can enter into 
249. ld. 
250. See id. (arguing that almost limitless power accorded to treaty makers under Holland is 
inconsistent with principle that federal government is one of limited powers). 
251. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1314 (2000) (defending decision in 
Holland and hailing it as "one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of the constitutional law of 
foreign affairs"). But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HA.Rv. L. REv. 
1868, 1875 (2005) (criticizing Holland as wrongly decided and arguing that Louis Henkin's historical 
defense of Holland is based on false premise). 
252. See Flaherty, supra note 112, at 2120-51 (reviewing records of Constitutional Convention 
and ratification debates and finding them to support notion that treaties were to be presumptively self-
executing); Vazquez, supra note 113, at 2161 (contending that not one "shred of evidence,'-' exists that 
anyone intended to allow House of Representatives authority "to block compliance with treaties 
already in force"). 
253. Jack Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Tteatyma/dng Clause as a Case Study, 1 
PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984). Yoo's response to the argument based on the Supremacy Oause is 
that it is a federalist clause that does not address separation of powers. Yoo, supra note 4, at 230. 
254. Flaherty, supra note 112; at 2127. 
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international agreements.255 Instead, Yoo would require that the United States 
enter into international agreements pursuant to Article II's treaty provisions "for 
. . 
regulating subjects that rest outside of Congress's Article I powers" and "in 
areas that are the subject of the concurrent powers of the executive and 
legislative branches."256 But congressional-executive agreements are permissible 
''in areas such as international trade and finance, where any international 
agreement would require [congressional] cooperation for implementation 
anyway. ,257 
Y oo maintains that there is no "convincing textual or structural support'' for 
treating congressional-executive agreements as interchangeable with Article II 
treaties.258 He rejects the textual readings offered by Myres McDougal, Bruce 
Ackerman, and David Golove,259 as well as the judicial precedent-based 
arguments of McDougal and others.260 Since he sees these arguments as flawed, 
Yoo concludes that the real reason scholars support permitting the United States 
to enter into congressional executive agreements is prudential.261 But the 
"interchangeability" argument is unacceptable to Y oo because it distorts the 
constitutional structure by weakening the "president's formal foreign affairs 
powers. "262 Indeed, Y oo's arguments against interchangeability are powerful. 
Full interchangeability would permit "Congress to pursue its own foreign policy" 
and deprive Presidents of their power to terminate treaties unilaterally, unless 
we want to allow an exception to the general rule that Presidents cannot override 
a statute in cases whete the statute in question is an international agreement.263 
Moreover, if we accept the claim that the federal government can do more 
pursuant to its treaty powers than Congress can do pursuant to the Article I 
enumeration, interchangeability would permit Congress to expand its legislative 
255. Yoo, supra note 4, at 250-92 (Chapter 8: Law as Treaties? Statutes as International 
Agreements). 
256. I d. at 253. 
257. Jd. at 274. 
. . . 
258. /d. at 253. 
259. Id. at 253-56 (citing Bruce Ackerman & David M. Golove, Is NAfTA Constitutional?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 799, 811 (1995); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 13 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1791, 1808-14 (1998); Myers S. McDougal & Asher Lans,. Treaties and Congressional-Executive or 
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments _of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 203-06 
(1945)). 
260. Yoo, supra note 4, at 256-57 (citing EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE CONSTITU110N AND WORLD 
ORGANIZATION 43-46 (1944); McDougal & Lans, supra note_ 259, at 261-90; Quincy Wright, The 
United States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342-45 (1944)). Yoo also rejects 
Bruce Ackerman and David Golove"s argument that the permissibility of congressional-executive is 
established through a constitutional transformation that occurred as part of an in.formal amendment 
process associated with the New Deal. Jd. at 260-64. 
261. See id. at 257 ("Congressional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what 
was seen as an outmoded method for dealing witb international affairs with a more efficient, 
democratic process."). 
262. /d. at 270. 
263. /d. at 271. 
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power in ways that would undermine both the separation of powers and 
federalism.264 
Yoo is far more sympathetic to arguments that the Article II treaty process 
should be the exclusive means by which the United States enters into 
international agreements.265 In his view, this "exclusivist" argument fails, 
however, because it confuses U.S. sovereignty as a matter of international law 
with domestic sovereignty. It would pertnit the federal government to bind state 
and local governments through international agreements in a way that cannot b'e 
reconciled with federalist principles.266 Thus, for example, when the United 
States agreed to certain World Trade Organization ("WTO'.') provisions, it 
remained free to choose how and whether to live up to the WTO's requirements, 
and no WTO body could order one of the states to abide by its regulations.267 
Yoo is certainly correct about the WTO, but it is hard to see how the point 
relates to treaty exclusivity. 
While Y oo's case against interchangeability is multivalent and consistent 
with his structural approach, his argument against treaty exclusivity seems 
undertheorized, Yoo is correct that if exclusivity were embraced, "about 90 
percent of the international agreements m~de by the United States since World 
War II would be invalid."268 But such prudential arguments should count for 
little if the object is to be true to constitutional text, structure, and history. The 
Constitution provides for a treaty process. It does not contemplate an 
alternative. This is not to say that we should abandon congressional-executive 
agreements, but only to point out that Yoo has not offered a satisfactory 
constitutional argument against treaty exclusivity. In addition, given the focus on 
separation of powers in Yoo's structural approach, one would think he would be 
concerned with sole executive agreements, which bypass entirely the 
constitutionally ordained role of the Congress in treaty making. But Yoo barely 
mentions sole executive agreements and relegates to a footnote discussion of 
Nixon's use of such an instrument to terminate the Vietnam War.269 
. . . . . 
E. Conclusion: Balancing Executive Power and International Law 
The second half of Yoo's book contains a series of arguments about the 
treaty power, all of which purport to derive from his view that the constitutional 
design calls for a strict separation between foreign affairs powers, which are 
exercised by the President, and legislative powers, which belong to Congress. 
Despite the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause, Yoo does not seem to 
recognize treaty law or international law as meaningful constraints on the 
264. Yoo, supra note 4, at 271-73. 
265. See id. at 264-66 (favorably discussing Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 
(1995)). 
266. I d. at 266-69. 
267. Id. at 268-69. 
268. /d. at 269. 
269. Yoo,supra note 4, at 285 & n.58. 
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President. Thus, Yoo believes that the President is free to implement, interpret, 
and terminate treaties in a manner consistent with the interests of the United 
States as he perceives them.270 Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela has suggested that 
what Yoo calls "revisionism" is more aptly described as a "school" of 
"Nationalist International Law,"271 and a nationalist approach is very clear in 
Yoo's rejection, in the context of his discussion of the treaty power, of the 
efficacy of international law. 
Yoo promotes the notion that treaties be presumptively non-self-executing, 
lest the executive treaty power encroach on legislative powers in the domestic 
arena. Congressional-executive agreements are permissible only in those 
substantive areas within Congress's Article I powers. In this way, Congress will 
not be permitted to use the treaty power to encroach on the executive's foreign 
affairs power, nor will it be permitted to broaden the scope of its legislative 
powers at the expense of the states and the people. At the same time, the 
executive's foreign affairs power will always be subject to a legislative check, as 
congressional implementation will always be required, whether the United States 
enters into an international agreement by treaty or by statute.272 
This Part has argued that Yoo's arguments on the treaty power, which are 
generally inventive, sophisticated, and well-researched, and many of which are 
• 
persuasive, are nonetheless burdened with a methodological eclecticism that 
renders suspect his commitment to developing an interpretation that is true to 
constitutional text, structure, and history. B_ut one cannot simply conclude, as 
some have, that Yoo's aim is to expand executive power at all costs.273 Yoo is 
genuinely concerned that the federal government's treaty-making power be 
constrained and answerable to the political institutions most directly accountable 
to the American people. 
While Yoo is committed to an expansive view of executive power, a view 
that permits the President to act aggressively in pursuit of the national interest, 
he also warns against permitting any branch of the federal government to be 
empowered to bind the United States to abide by international law.274 Yoo 
would not subordinate national security to the United States' commitments 
under the UN Charter to refrain from the unauthorized use of force,275 nor 
270. See id. at 187 (observing that Presidents interpret or terminate treaties as necessary incident 
to executing U.S. foreign policy). 
271. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist 
School of International Law in the United States, GLOBAL JURIST F'RON11ERS, 2005, at 1, 5, 14. 
272. Yoo, supra note 4, at 273·74. 
273. See Cole, supra note 9, at 8 (contending that Yoo's argumentation would support legality of 
presidential resort to genocide). 
274. See Ybo, supra note 4, at 172-73 (treating Kosovo intervention as evidence in support of his 
view that Presidents are not bound by international law); id. at 209 (contending that Congress has 
power to terminate treaties). 
275. See id. at 245 (positing that, except for self-defense or Security Council authorization, self-
execution of treaties makes any executive use of force illegal and unconstitutional); id. ("In using force 
against Kosovo, the United States violated the- U.N. Charter and President Ointon, under a self--
execution theoryt failed to perfornt his ·constitutional duty to enforce the laws of the land."). 
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would he permit the United States to commit its armed forces to an international 
engagement because the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force. 276 Y oo 
is also apprehensive that the United States might have to abide by adverse 
decisions of international courts277 and that American citizens might be 
subjected "to international rules and organizations. "278 When Y oo's arguments 
relating to treaties reflect a policy bias, it is a bias not in favor of executive power 
but against international law. 
V. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION AF'I'ER 9/11 
Although both books under review in this Essay suggest that 9/11 and the 
war on terror have had an impact on the constitutional allocation of foreign 
affairs powers, neither book specifies what that impact ought to be.279 Yoo 
comes the closest, in arguing that the flexibility built into the Constitution 
permits unilateral executive acts of war in response to the novel threats of the 
post-9/11 world.280 But Yoo forrnulated many of the arguments in his book in 
essays published before 9/11, so it is hard for him to claim that either 9/11 or the 
war-on terror justify novel approaches to the constitutional design. The threats to 
national security posed by terrorist organizations, while certainly significant, pale 
in comparison to the national security threats that the United States faced during 
the Cold War, or even to the threats that the young republic faced when it was a 
fledgling state confronting e,ighteenth- and nineteenth-century superpowers. The 
276., See id. at 246 (noting that "many scholars believe •... that if the Security Council authorizes 
war as it did in the 1991 Persian Gulf War th~ United States must use force: to meet the goals set 
out by the Council"). This is a strange claim. First, a Security Council Resolution authorizing the use 
of force (not "war)') does not obligate any member state to actually use force. Second, since such a 
Resolution cannot pass over U.S. opposition, the United States would never be called on to join in 
UN-authorized military action against its will; unless one believes, and Yoo does not, that the U.S. 
executive lacks the power to embroil the U.S. armed forces in conflict. 
277. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 248 (''Presidents are not about to issue unilateral orders to state 
prisons halting the executions of foreign nationals duly convicted of capital murder."). It is open to 
question whether the foreign nationals at issue here were "duly convicted," since the-United States 
does not dispute that they were not accorded their consular rights guaranteed under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 
v. U.S~) 2004 I.C.J. 1, 42·43 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/ 
imusframe.htm (finding that United States breached its obligatio~s- under Article 36 of Geneva 
Convention on Consular Relations to inform detained Mexican nationals of their consular visitation 
rights); Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Attorney General 
of the United States (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ 
20050228-lS.html (stating that United States would comply with Avena decision "by having State 
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the_ 
51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision"). 
278. Yoo, supra note 4, at 267. 
279. See id. at x ("These new threats [the 9/11 attacks] to American national security, driven by 
_changes in the international environrne.nt, should change the way we think about the relationship 
between the process and substance of the warmaking system."); IRONS, supra note 3, at 3 (suggesting 
that issue of constitutional allocation of war powers is especially significant in light of war on terror). 
280. Yoo, supra note 4, at x (arguing that after 9/11, ''United States must have the option to use_ 
force earlier and more quickly than in the past"). 
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fact that the enemies in the war on terror are often nonstate actors also does not 
present novel legal issues, as the United States faced threats from nonstate 
actors, in the form of Indian tribes and the Barbary pirates,. at the time of the 
founding and in the early republic. 
If the post-9/11 world does pose new challenges in the realm of the 
constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers, it is not because of 9/11 but 
because of the rise of international organizations, including the United Nations 
and other collective security organizations. The problem with Irons's approach is 
that it would freeze the constitutional allocation of war powers, even if our 
current practice ignores that allocation, without providing a normative argument 
for why we should today remain bound by an eighteenth-century model. From a 
methodological perspective, Y oo's approach is clearly preferable, and this brief 
concluding Part suggests how one might follow Yoo's methodology to different 
conclusions about the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers. 
In Part V.A below, this Essay lays out alternative structural readings of the 
Constitution that would produce different results. In Part V.B, this Essay 
provides a prudential argument for a new understanding of the constitutional 
allocation of war powers that moves beyond both Irons's traditionalism and 
Yoo's revisionist nationalism. 
A. An Alternative Structural Approach to the Foreign Affairs Power 
A structural approach to the Constitution builds arguments based on 
inferences from the fundamental principles underlyin-g the Constitution as well 
as from the relationships among those principles. 281 Structural arguments are 
thus at least one and possibly two steps removed from textual arguments.282 
They require no specific textual hook; rather, they are persuasive to the extent 
that the interpreter can convince us both of the importance of the structural 
principles at issue and that their interactions within the constitutional edifice 
have been properly specified. In short, a structural approach takes a holistic view 
of the Constitution, envisioning "the document as a unified whole and its various 
provisions and clauses as mutually reinforcing"283 and "attending to the overall 
design of the Constitution and the mutually conditioning relationships among its 
provisions. "284 Advocates of structural approaches to the Constitution argue that 
our textual approach to constitutional adjudication forces courts to bind 
281., See BOBBI'IT, supra note 26, at 74 ("Structural arguments are .inferences from the existence 
of constitutional structures and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these 
structures."). 
282. See id. (''[Structural arguments] are to be distinguished from textual and historical 
arguments, which construe a particular constitutional passage and the·n use that construction in the 
reasoning of an opinion.''). 
283. Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutionalism of Mary Ann Glendon, 73 NoTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1333, 1349 (1998}. 
284. Mary Ann Glendo:n, Toward a Structural Approach to Constitutional Interpretation, in 
BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONS'J'ITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 141, 148 {Terry 
Eastland ed., 1995). 
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themselves to "the stated intent, however nonsensical, of somebody else. "285 For 
better or worse, structural approaches permit much more creativity in 
constitutional interpretation, as one can always stress one structural element 
over others in order to reach a desired result. What follows is a small exercise in 
the art not science of structural interpretation designed not to displace Yoo's 
approach but to suggest how it might be supplemented. 
·Yoo's. structural approach emphasizes. separation of powers, at times at the 
expense of other structural elements and even at the expense of express 
language that undercuts his view of constitutional structure. Preservation of 
individual rights figures not at all in his approach to executive power, nor does 
his discussion of war powers ever acknowledge the principle of limited 
government as a significant element of the Constitution's structure. His approach 
is thus inconsistent, as principles of federalism and of limited government figure 
prominently (and appropriately) in his discussion of the treaty power.286 Much of 
Yoo's approach to the foreign affairs power hinges on the thesis that Article II's 
Vesting Clause functions as a general grant of foreign affairs power to the 
President, subject only to the limitations enumerated in the Constitution. Yoo 
does not consider how the principles of limited government and federalism 
embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments impact on this Vesting Clause 
thesis.287 
Irons's approach to the constitutional allocation of war powers assumes 
congressional control and judicial oversight. But recent scholarship has 
suggested that a large role for the judiciary in ·deciding vital matters of war and 
peace would not have accorded with the Framers' conviction that sovereignty 
ultimately resides with the people and their representatives.288 Although Yoo 
does not invoke this scholarship, it is supportive of the part of his attack on the 
traditional perspective of war powers that would not bold the executive 
accountable through judicial mechanisms. Still, Yoo could not wholeheartedly 
embrace the pers_pective of popular constitutionalism because its main structural 
focus is on popular sovereignty as the ultimate. check on the federal government. 
285. CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCfURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969). 
286. See supra notes 245·51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Missouri v. Holland within 
the context of Yoo's federalism. 
287. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of Thinking About 
Unenumerated Rights Inspired by Philip Bobbitt;s Constitutional Fate, 75 Miss. L.J. 495, 497 (2006) 
(noting that traditional view of Ninth Amendment is to establish that federal government is ·one of 
limited powers); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendmentt 83 TEX. L. REV. 
'331, 336 (2004) (arguing that original purpose of Ninth Amendment was to create "a rule of 
construction that limited the interpretation of enJ,lmerated federal power"); Telman, supra note 195, at 
184-88 (arguing that notion of inherent executive authority is inconsistent with principle of limited 
government embodied in Tenth Amendment). 
288. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: PQPULAR CONSTfl"UTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) (noting that people possess "[f]inal interpretive authority" of 
Constitution and both courts and political branches were subordinate to this authority); MARK 
TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITU'IlON AWAY FROM THE CoURTS, at X (1999) {developing populist 
the-ory of constitutional law in which judiciary's constitutional interpretation "has no special normative 
weight''). 
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The popular constitutionalists thus view the Framers as having embraced a 
robust form of participatory democracy that could fetter unilateral executive 
action.289 
Finally, neither Yoo nor Irons provides a satisfactory account of the 
interaction between international law and domestic law or of the Framers' views 
• • I • • 
on the extent to which international law, or the law of nations, is incorporated 
into U.S. law. The Supreme Court's recourse to international and foreign law in 
determining "society's evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth 
Amendment in Roper v.; Simmons290 has revived academic interest in this 
issue. 291 Recent scholarship suggests that the Framers fully expected 
international law to be binding law enforceable through U.S. courts.292 
International law could thus be another structural element to consider in 
interpreting the Constitution's foreign affairs powers provisions. Alternatively, 
from a nonoriginalist perspective, developments in international law and 
especially in collective security since World War II provide grounds for 
argument that the constitutional allocation of war powers should be set aside in 
favor of the modern law of multinational cooperation and collective security.293 
B. The Foreign Affairs Power in an Age of Multilateralism 
Because this Essay has rejected the Vesting Clause thesis, it concludes that 
the constitutional text, structure, and pre-1950 history overwhelmingly support 
the traditional perspective, favoring congressional involvement in decision-
making processes relating to war. But the fact that Irons has the stronger 
289. According to Kramer, the Federalists envisioned that "formidable popular resistance- via 
e1ections, juries, popular outcries, or, in the unlikely event that all these failed, by more violent forms 
of opposition" would prevent abuse of power by the federal government. KRAMER, supra note 288, at 
83-84. 
290. 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
291. See, e.g., Sarah H. Oeveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT;L L. 1, 7 (2006) 
(arguing that constitutional design encourages consultation of international law); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109-10 
(2005) (hailing Roper as "a return to traditional methods of analysis, dating back to the Court's 
earliest discussions of the Eighth Amendment;.' in which the Supreme Court considered foreign law in 
determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the 
Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REv. 129, 140 (2005) ("[E]ven if the modern death penalty is 
quintessentially and peculiarly American, the accumulated legal wisdom of mankind, embodied in ius 
gentium, may still have something to offer us."); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator 
Problem, 119 HARV. L. REv. 148, 149 (2005) ("The Supreme Court's use of foreign law in 
constitutional interpretation is hardly new."). 
292. See G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 780 
(2006) (''[I]t is clear that the_ framers of [the Alien Tort Statute] anticipated that both state and federal 
courts would be treating ~the law of nations' as part of the common law they declared and applied in 
their decisions."). 
293. Both Thomas Franck and David Golove have argued that the constitutional allocation of 
war powers have already been changed due to the impact of collective security agreements. See supra 
note 195 for a discussion of U.S. execulive power when committing to U.N. actions. They may 
overstate the extent to which that change has already occurred, but they also point the w~y for fuller 
U.S. commitment to global security through collective security. 
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argument on constitutional interpretation does not put him in a celebratory 
mood, because there is no question that the constitutional allocation of war 
powers has been disregarded in the nuclear age. During the Cold War, Congress 
acquiesced in executive unilateralism in response to "three decades of almost 
uninterrupted crisis in foreign policy''294 and the sense that, given the nuclear 
threat, the President needed the capacity for immediate and decisive response to 
perceived national security threats. Such congressional acquiescence in executive 
unilateralism is no longer appropriate. 
Irons's book sets out to demonstrate the dangers of executive unilateralism, 
which he links to the United States' imperialist foreign policy. However, his 
book actually demonstrates that the political branches have largely worked in 
harmony in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Where Congress supports executive 
unilateralism295 but the United States' treaty obligations demand cooperation, 
national unilateralism poses larger constitutional problems than does executive 
unilateralism. The United States committed itself in 1945 to a collective security 
system that prohibits unilateral use of force other than in self-defense.296 The 
Cold War did not p,ermit that system to operate as it was designed,297 but the end 
of the bipolar world offered an opportunity to revive a collective security system 
of which the United States was the chief architect.298 That opportunity is slipping 
away but is not yet lost. In order to be true to the design of both the Constitution 
and the UN Charter, the President should work with Congress to realize U.S. 
treaty obligations relating to peace and security. 
Yoo's view that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in 
constitutional text or structure. Yoo and the revisionsists would have us favor 
domestic policy ends over international law and treaty obligations in every 
instance.299 That is contrary both to the understandings of the Framers and to 
our constitutional history, which has long recognized that international law is 
294. S. REP. No. 93-220, at 8 (1973). 
295. See IRONS, supra note 3, at 269 (arguing that Congress has responded to executive 
unilateralism in realm of war powers with "blank-check authorizations"). 
296. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51; see also HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 250 ("The 
prohibition on the use of force is the principal norm of modern international law."). 
297. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 253-54. 
298. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, Acr OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES AND ENEMIES; AND 
THEIR QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD, at xiii (2003) (noting "historic role of the United States in 
creating" United Nations). 
299. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 171 (contending that "inclusion of customary international 
law as federal common law is open to serious doubt"); id. at 172-73 (concluding, upon review of recent 
U.S. military conduct, that "international law is not binding within the American legal system") ; see 
also John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 221 (2000) 
(characterizing "globalist" agenda of international law as reducing constitutional autonomy, impairing 
popular sovereignty, reducing U.S. international power, and limiting its domestic and foreign policy 
options); John R. Bolton, U.S. Isn't Legally Obligated to Pay the U.N. , WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at 
A27 (arguing that United States is not obligated to pay UN dues because treaties are not law but 
merely political obligations). 
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part of our law.300 A President acts in bad faith with respect both to the 
Constitution and to international law by ratifying a treaty without first making 
certain that portions of the treaty requiring domestic implementation can and 
will be implemented. Failure to do so implicates the Take Care Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause and violates the primary norm of international law: p.acta sunt 
servanda.301 The Senate similarly acts in bad faith when it consents to the 
ratification of a treaty that requires domestic implementation and then does 
nothing to implement the treaty.302 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FuTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Y oo and Irons both assume that the Constitution matters, but they do not 
tell us why or to what extent. The Constitution should matter. In areas where the 
constitutional text is clear, we should presumptively follow the constitutional 
text. The Declare War Clause may not be a model of clarity. It was hastily 
composed ''toward the end of the [Constitutional] Convention, in response to 
objections raised from the Convention floor;''303 John Yoo describes the clause 
as the product of an "obscure, garbled, last-minute debate~"304 However, the 
enumeration of other war powers in Article I, the Constitution's structural 
limitations on executive power, the statements of the Framers as to their 
understandings of the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the practice of 
the political branches in the early republic all support the traditional view 
favoring congressional initiative in matters relating to war and peace. 
Increasingly since World War II and certainly since 9/11, Congress has 
instead ceded its constitutional war powers to the executive. 305 It seems unlikely 
300. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."). 
301. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, art. 26 ("Every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."}. 
302. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") specifies 
that the parties to it are obligated to implement it. See International Covenant on Civil and Political 
. . 
Rights art. 2, para. 2, opened for signature Dec~ 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521,999 U.N~T.S. 171 ("Where 
not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and 
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary 
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."). The Senate, in granting its advice 
and consent ~o the treaty, spe.cified that it viewed the treaty as non-self-executing. See 138 CONG. REC. 
84781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (declaring that United States regardS provisions of Articles 1 through 27 
of Covenant non-self-executing). Because Congress has never passed implementing legislation; 
plaintiffs have been unable to sustain causes of action claiming violations of the ICCPR in U.S. courts. 
See, e.g., White v. Paulson; 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (concluding that ICCPR does 
not give rise to private right of action with respect to plaintiffs' claims, as treaty is non-self-executing 
and Congress has passed no implementing legislation). 
303. Ramsey, Text and History, supra note71, .at 1709. 
304. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, supra note 8, at 1656. 
305. See IRONS,. supra note 3, at 180-204 (decrying "congressional abdication" of its constitutional 
war powers, beginning with Vietnam War); Fisher, supra note 242, at 946·83 (arguing that multilateral 
treaties have facilitated postwar expansion of executive war powers). 
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that any court will ever decide whether that abdication was lawful or whether 
Congress can retrieve the powers that it ceded. The question is thus far more 
likely to be decided through politics than law. As John Yoo acknowledges, 
through its appropriations power, Congress has the power to rein in the 
executive whenever it likes.306 The real problem is not institutional competence 
but institutional self-confidence. 
Although the Constitution provides the starting point for any serious 
discussion of the allocation of the foreign affairs power, ultimately the issue will 
not be decided based on the original intentions of the Framers. As Irons 
concludes with resignation, ''only the collective voices and votes of the American 
people can provide answers to the questions posed in this book: How and why do 
we go to war?"307 But Breyer's Hamdan concurrence, combined with the new 
academic interest in popular constitutionalism, puts a more hopeful spin on 
Irons's conclusion. The Framers expected that the country would work out 
constitutional conflicts through democratic means. All three branches have 
constitutional authority to interpret the constitutional allocation of the foreign 
affairs powers, and the citizens of the United States must hold them accountable 
when they do so in error. 
306. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 9 ("Congress's authority over funding and lawmaking is a 
powerful tool that can easily frustrate unilateral executive policies."). 
307. IRONS, supra note 3, at 263. 
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